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Abstract: 
Consumption taxes are a primary source of tax revenue and, against the common intuition, firms 
might bear the respective tax burden. However, it is largely unknown how firms respond to 
consumption taxes. We examine whether service firms in Europe respond to consumption taxes 
and whether managing sales as the respective tax base is interrelated with subsequent income 
tax-motivated profit shifting. We exploit corporate affiliate-level panel data and a unique setting 
in Europe over the period 2007-2015 with 72 staggered and plausibly exogenous consumption 
and corporate income tax rate changes. We find that firms, on average, exhibit a negative value-
added tax-rate semi-elasticity of reported sales of around 0.5. Consistent with theory and incen-
tives from the European value-added tax system, the effect is stronger for firms with greater 
discretion over the jurisdiction of value-added tax liability (firms in the digital service sector) 
and firms facing greater demand elasticity. We then show that the extent and the channels of 
profit shifting depend on firms’ responsiveness to consumption taxes consistent with managing 
sales in response to consumption taxes placing a constraint on manipulating transfer prices for 
intra-group trade. Our study thereby provides novel insights for the design of multidimensional 
tax systems. 
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1. Introduction 
Consumption taxes are one of the most important tax policy instruments and account for more 
than 25 percent of the European Union’s 2016 EUR 4 trillion tax revenue compared to the less 
than 10 percent contribution of corporate income taxes.1 Profit and consumption taxation can 
therefore be seen as substitutes for generating tax revenue from the perspective of governments 
(Dharmapala 2014). Prior research has focused on analyzing the effects of corporate income 
taxes (CIT) on corporate decisions, but has largely neglected the fact that firms are liable to pay 
multiple taxes including consumption taxes (Christensen et al. 2001, Keen and Lockwood 2010, 
Robinson 2012, Scholes et al. 2015, p. 19).2 While governments levy consumption taxes with 
the intent to tax final consumption (by final consumers), firms regularly bear part of the tax 
burden (Poterba 1996, Fullerton and Metcalf 2002). Against this backdrop, this paper investi-
gates the extent to which firms respond to changes in consumption taxes and whether such 
behavior explains cross-sectional differences in corporate income tax planning. 
Understanding the effects of consumption taxes on firms’ decision-making as well as the inter-
play of consumption and profit taxes is crucial for evaluating tax policy (Robinson and Slemrod 
2012, Kopczuk and Slemrod 2006) and for tax management decisions (Scholes and Wolfson 
1992). There is an ongoing policy debate on the design of tax systems building on consumption 
versus income taxation.3 Within this context, the historical discourse on the efficiency of com-
pany taxation based on profits and capital versus consumption is blooming again.4 A cash-flow 
tax in the form of an international corporate consumption tax has been heatedly debated in the 
United States (U.S.) (Auerbach et al. 2017, Devereux and Vella 2017).5 However, a pure con-
sumption tax-based system may not be the perfect solution, as challenges of existing systems 
demonstrate. The European Commission (2017a, 2018b) attributes an estimated annual loss of 
EUR 147 billion due to insufficient tax enforcement and collection in combination with firms’ 
incentives and activities to avoid consumption taxes. 
                                                          
1 Tax revenue excluding social security contributions, see http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/in-
dex.php/Tax_revenue_statistics#Main_tables. 
2 For the remainder of this paper, we use the terms income and direct taxation and consumption and indirect 
taxation interchangeably. In Europe consumption taxation takes on the form of a value-added tax (VAT). 
3 Especially in the globalized and increasingly digitalized economy, both direct and indirect taxation is a pressing 
concern of policy makers but empirical evidence on the associated tax challenges is very scarce (European Com-
mission 2014, 2018a; OECD 2015, 2018). Also see Olbert and Spengel (2017) for an overview. 
4 See e.g. Kopczuk and Slemrod (2006); Arnold et al. (2011). Among others, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) analyse 
the merits of indirect vs. direct taxation of individuals and highlight the interdependence of both taxes within a tax 
system. 
5 Furthermore, there is an ongoing discussion about whether introducing a value-added tax would increase the 
competitiveness of the U.S. tax system while serving as a stable source of tax revenue (e.g. Graetz 2016). 
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For businesses in the European Union, consumption taxes exhibit an important cash-outflow 
given value-added taxes (VAT) are charged on a gross basis (on revenue) at rates of often above 
20 percent. In contrast to the simple notion that consumption taxes are borne by the final con-
sumer, economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that the tax burden may partially fall 
on firms (Fullerton and Metcalf 2002, Poterba 1996, Christensen et al. 2001, Kenkel 2005, Alm 
et al. 2009, Kosonen 2015). The extent of tax incidence on firms depends on the relative elas-
ticity of supply and demand (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1972, Fullerton and Metcalf 2002). If firms 
bear part of the tax burden, consumption taxes constitute a cost factor and reduce firms’ surplus. 
Recent evidence supports this view and suggests that VAT and sales tax regimes around the 
globe have a negative influence on corporate investment (Jacob et al. 2018). This result is at-
tributed to capital demand decreasing in firms’ consumption tax burden. We examine this mech-
anism more directly by focusing on the relationship between VAT and firms’ output. 
We study the European setting in which multinational enterprises (MNEs) have an incentive to 
engage in profit shifting, i.e. to report higher (lower) pre-tax profits at the affiliate level in 
countries with lower (higher) CIT rates. At the same time, firms might strategically report sales 
in response to consumption taxes (VAT in Europe). Firms’ output response to consumption 
taxes may be driven by two mechanisms: the incidence of VAT falling on firms and decreasing 
marginal profits or firms exploiting consumption tax planning opportunities to maximize cash 
flows. We argue that reporting sales in response to consumption taxes may constrain the firm’s 
ability to shift income to optimize income taxes given that sales are one key determinant of pre-
tax income.6  
We begin our analysis by documenting that firms’ output decreases with the VAT rate. We 
expect and find industry-specific results consistent with the different relevance of VAT for 
these firms’ after-tax cash flows, different proximities to final consumers, and different VAT 
avoidance opportunities. We subsume this behavior under the notion of corporate consumption 
tax planning in a wider sense, i.e. either as the result of considering lower marginal profits 
because of VAT incidence or of strategically reporting sales in low VAT jurisdictions. We fur-
ther show that firms’ consumption tax responsiveness varies with a firm’s relative size in the 
industry, a proxy for its market share that is typically associated with a lower elasticity of de-
mand. We then hypothesize that firms alter their profit shifting behavior depending on their 
sensitivity to VAT with respect to reported sales. We find that firms’ income tax-motivated 
                                                          
6 In the setting of our study, for instance, regulations for both types of taxes overlap such as Articles 72 and 80 of 
the European VAT directive referring to the arm’s length principle for determining tax bases just as the existing 
international transfer pricing regulation does (Matesanz 2018). 
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profit shifting activity changes in their propensity towards managing consumption taxes. Con-
sistent with VAT considerations constraining the flexibility to manage pre-tax income, firms’ 
profit shifting behavior via transfer pricing (debt financing) decreases (increases) when they 
report sales in response to VAT.  
The negative relationship between corporate income taxes and multinational enterprises’ 
(MNEs) reported profits is well-documented.7 However, there is only limited evidence on why 
some firms engage in more profit shifting than others (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010).8 Further, 
only a few studies examine whether firms aim to minimize both income and non-income taxes 
(Robinson 2012) or whether they alter their profit shifting behavior if conflicting incentives 
between income tax rates and customs duties arise (Swenson 2001, Blouin et al. 2018). Blouin 
et al. (2018) provide novel evidence that firms face a trade-off between minimizing income 
taxes and customs duties through transfer pricing. In a similar vein, this paper examines whether 
there are trade-offs in firms’ tax planning behavior with regards to corporate income and con-
sumption taxes. We go beyond existing approaches in the profit shifting literature and integrate 
consumption taxes in our analysis because they have significant implications for MNEs’ tax-
related costs (Christensen et al. 2001, Robinson 2012, Dyreng and Maydew 2018). In addition, 
practitioners highlight that VAT considerations affect transfer pricing decisions (Ernst & 
Young 2013).  
We exploit a large panel of affiliate-level financial data from the Amadeus database provided 
by Bureau van Dijk and empirically investigate how firms react to consumption and corporate 
income taxes through reporting choices at the affiliate level. Our focus on service providers in 
the European market offers a unique setting for investigating the effects of direct and indirect 
taxation on MNEs’ tax planning decisions for several reasons. First, economic policy is largely 
harmonized in the European market. Thus, other policy factors should not confound the analy-
sis. Second, the European market is characterized by open borders in particular with regards to 
services. As a result, service providers are able to freely locate employees and assets as well as 
generate cross-border sales within the EU.9 Third, consumption taxes play a larger role in the 
service sector due to proximity to final consumers (Robinson 2012). Forth, there is substantial 
variation in EU countries’ tax policy despite the EU’s efforts to ensure a minimum standard of 
                                                          
7 See e.g. Hines and Rice (1994); Huizinga and Laeven (2008); Dharmapala (2014). See Heckemeyer and Overesch 
(2017) for an overview. 
8 See e.g. Klassen et al. (2014); De Simone (2016); and De Simone et al. (2017). 
9 See e.g. the Digital Single Market initiative, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/digital-single-market_en. 
The policy objective is to unlock the potential of cross-border electronic trade in terms of a broader range of 
products and services and lower prices, contributing EUR 415 billion p.a. to Europe’s economy.  
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tax harmonization. In our sample, CIT rates varied from 10% in Bulgaria to 38.93% in France 
in 2015.10 VAT rates ranged from 17% in Luxembourg to 27% in Hungary. We exploit 40 and 
32 plausibly exogenous CIT and VAT rate changes in both directions in the sample period 
(2007-2015) that provide a favorable setting for identification. 
We test the relation of VAT and firms’ reported output while controlling for unobserved, time 
invariant firm characteristics and changes in consumer prices and inflation in order to isolate 
the response attributable to consumption tax planning from consumer market and macroeco-
nomic effects that might be correlated with tax policy. We find that firms’ reported output, 
measured by sales, exhibits a negative VAT semi-elasticity of 0.5. This contrasts the traditional 
view that consumption taxes do not affect corporate decision-making given they are borne by 
consumers and adds to prior empirical evidence on the tax incidence of consumption taxes.  
In cross-sectional tests, we provide evidence consistent with the underlying mechanisms of this 
behavior and also control for unobserved variation over time at the country-level such as eco-
nomic conditions and other policy changes. The reaction to VAT due to the tax incidence falling 
on firms is present for B2C firms, which are always liable to the VAT in their country of incor-
poration and possibly face more elastic demand due to their proximity to end customers. There 
is no effect for B2B and intra-group service firms, for which VAT paid is refunded (so-called 
input VAT) and does not translate into an ultimate financial burden. While VAT is generally 
due in the country where the consumer is located, which - in theory - provides no incentive to 
report sales in response to VAT rates, enforcement of this destination rule is considered prob-
lematic (OECD 2017a, p. 13). More so, firms offering digital services, such as content stream-
ing and web platforms, are liable for VAT in the country of their incorporation irrespective of 
the location of the consumer. This differential treatment provides digital service firms with the 
opportunity to strategically report sales in order to minimize the VAT burden and, thus, obtain 
a competitive advantage. Consistently, we find the strongest significant association between the 
VAT rate and reported sales for the subset of digital service affiliates. 
Next, we develop and test our hypothesis that focuses on the relationship between a firm’s 
consumption tax responsiveness and its profit shifting behavior. Since taxable corporate profits 
are defined as the difference between sales and costs of goods sold, manipulating sales as the 
value-added tax base might constrain the flexibility to react to income tax incentives. Building 
                                                          
10 These rates reflect effective CIT rates without considering special incentives such as the notional interest de-
duction in Belgium or the 14 IP box regimes in place that substantially lower the effective applicable CIT rate. 
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on the findings of Blouin et al. (2018), we conjecture that firms’ profit shifting behavior de-
pends on the consumption tax sensitivity. We predict that profit shifting behavior is attenuated 
if firms report sales in response to consumption taxes. We first replicate established profit shift-
ing models (in particular based on Hines and Rice 1994, Huizinga and Laeven 200811) and 
document shifting behavior of our sample firms consistent with prior estimates. To examine the 
relation between consumption tax planning and income tax-motivated profit shifting, we con-
struct a measure of the firm-specific VAT sensitivity with respect to reporting sales and inte-
grate this measure in the analysis of profit shifting. We then extend the baseline model and 
interact the firm-specific VAT sensitivity with the CIT. Our results indicate that profit shifting 
behavior is, on average, reduced to an insignificant level if firms’ reported sales are negatively 
associated with VAT rates. We show that only firms that do not report lower sales in response 
to increasing VAT rates appear to engage in income tax-motivated profit shifting consistent 
with consumption tax planning placing a constraint on profit shifting opportunities. At the same 
time, firms facing such constraint appear to more extensively exploit interest expenses as an 
alternative to transfer pricing as a profit shifting mechanism (Heckemeyer and Overesch 2017). 
Our study offers several contributions. First, we study corporate behavior regarding the manip-
ulation of tax bases for different types of taxes, which is highly relevant when deciding on 
adequate tax policy (Christensen et al. 2001, Keen and Lockwood 2010, Fox et al. 2014). Ex-
isting research mostly investigates the effects of direct and indirect taxation on corporate be-
havior separately. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate whether and to 
what extent VAT influences firms’ reported output. We identify two mechanisms underlying 
this behavior. First, firms may bear part of the consumption tax incidence, which causes them 
to decrease output (Jacob et al. 2018). This behavior is more pronounced for firms facing rela-
tively elastic demand. Second, firms exploit consumption tax planning opportunities. Since we 
also establish a relationship between this consumption tax channel and corporate income tax 
planning, we answer the call to comprehensively study the interaction of a tax system’s different 
features and their effect on corporate decision-making (Kopczuk and Slemrod 2006, p. 133-
134, Robinson and Slemrod 2012, Dyreng and Maydew 2018). In particular, we provide novel 
evidence on the interplay of profit and consumption taxes.  
Second, our study adds to the profit shifting literature. In the vein of Klassen et al. (2014), De 
Simone (2016) and De Simone et al. (2017), we provide a more nuanced view on profit shifting 
                                                          
11 We use the CIT rate at face value in contrast to the tax incentive variable put forward by Huizinga and Leaven 
(2008) since we do not include non-service affiliates of the MNE groups in our sample and we investigate the 
VAT-motivated sales reporting behavior separately. 
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incentives.12 We add to the recent findings of Blouin et al. (2018) and show that firms consider 
both income and consumption taxes in their tax planning strategies and that there is a trade-off 
with respect to minimizing the respective tax burdens. Overall, our results indicate that firms’ 
responsiveness to consumption taxes might explain why some firms appear not to engage in 
income-tax motivated profit shifting (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010, Dharmapala 2014). 
Finally, we provide insights with direct policy implications. We deliver evidence that digital 
service firms make use of the resulting competitive advantages, potentially adding to the Euro-
pean Commission’s estimated annual loss in VAT of EUR 147 billion. We note that digitaliza-
tion is not necessarily associated with more aggressive profit shifting behavior but might be of 
greater relevance for minimizing consumption taxes and thereby inform the debate on whether 
aggressive tax planning is exacerbated in the digital economy (OECD 2015). Overall, the in-
sights on service firms’ output decreasing in VAT are important for at least two reasons. First, 
our results suggest that both consumption taxes and income taxes affect corporate reporting 
behavior and decision-making. Second, our results suggest that consumption-oriented systems 
are not the solution to all problems attributed to tax planning behavior under profit taxation 
since indirect tax evasion exists and can be associated with distortions in production decisions 
(Virmani 1989). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section two, we elaborate on the institu-
tional background and derive our hypotheses for taxing sales and profits of service providers in 
Europe. Further, we motivate our study on the effects of consumption taxes and revisit prior 
literature on tax-motivated profit shifting. In section three, we describe our research design and 
the data. In section four, we present the results of our empirical tests. Section five concludes. 
2. Institutional Background, Related Literature and Hypotheses 
2.1. Value-added Taxation of Service Providers in Europe 
For a vast number of countries, indirect (including value-added) taxes are the most relevant 
type of tax and the key instrument of raising tax revenue.13 Value-added taxation in the EU is 
largely harmonized across the member states. Legislation on EU level defines the place of sup-
ply of goods and services (i.e. where the tax has to be remitted) and other features of the system, 
such as the debtor of the tax and the mechanism of remittance. Member states, however, are 
                                                          
12 Dharmapala (2014) also documents that the heterogeneity across previous studies has not been studied closely 
yet. 
13 E.g. in the European Union VAT makes up for EUR 1,044 billion compared to taxes on income of corporations 
of EUR 391 billion for the year 2016 (Eurostat 2018a). The U.S. collect less in sales taxes and more in CIT (about 
60%) (Engelen 2017). 
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free to choose the applicable VAT rate with a minimum threshold of 15 percent. As of 2015, 
VAT rates in the EU varied considerably between 17 and 27 percent. VAT is due on every sale 
of a company. The seller has to remit the tax independently of the nature of the transaction and 
the legal form of the buyer such that value-added taxes are collected on every stage of the value 
chain. In the case of business-to-business (B2B) transactions, the buyer as a business itself is 
granted a credit to subtract the tax from future tax remittances (input tax credit). In the case of 
business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions, the VAT becomes final at the stage of the consumer 
who is supposed to bear the ultimate burden of this type of consumption tax.14 Figure 1 illus-
trates the VAT collection and remittance process. 
The place of supply of services determines the tax liability and, thus, which country’s VAT is 
applied to the sale. As a general rule in the EU VAT system, the place of supply follows the 
destination principle.15 The place of supply is in the country where the final consumer is located 
(destination principle) and enforcement is comparable to sales taxes in a U.S. cross-state context 
(Fox et al. 2014). Consequently, exports are zero-rated and imports are taxed at the importing 
country’s rate. Many B2C services, however, are taxed where the supplier is established (origin 
principle).16 Since firms offering B2C services of digital nature, i.e. services delivered electron-
ically or online, had a competitive advantage by reporting remote sales in low VAT jurisdictions 
or avoiding the tax, the destination principle was introduced for this subgroup of services in 
2015.17  
These varying place of supply rules result in different tax consequences for the respective ser-
vice companies. Enforcement of the destination rule is considered problematic for the collection 
                                                          
14 In contrast, under the U.S. sales tax system only B2C transactions trigger a seller’s tax liability if the seller has 
a nexus in the consumer’s location. Sales to businesses as well as exports are directly exempt while imports are 
taxed at retail. Sales taxes are levied at state level on intrastate retail transactions with rules varying across states 
and states are unable to tax inter-state commerce. Regarding purchases made outside but used within a state, the 
customer needs to declare and remit use tax. However, compliance with the use tax is said to be very low. Since 
sellers only need to collect sales tax if they have a physical presence (nexus) in that state, this regulation ultimately 
results in an exemption of B2C remote sales (McLure (2002), p. 137; Bal (2015), p. 246). The mechanism of 
collection and remittance presents the main difference between the EU VAT and US sales tax system (Slemrod 
2008; Pomeranz 2015). 
15 Different place of supply rules apply depending on what type of goods or services are sold to what kind of 
customer. 
16 For B2B services, the place of supply used to follow the origin principle until 2009, (Article 44 of Directive 
2008/8/EC, introduced on 1 January 2010). The destination principle also applies to B2C services such as adver-
tising services, services of consultants and lawyers, financial services, telecommunications services, broadcasting 
services and electronically supplied services provided to customers established in a non-EU country (Article 56 of 
Directive 2006/112/EC, now Article 59 of Directive 2008/8/EC). For the full list of exceptions, see Articles 46-50 
and 53-57 of Directive 2006/112/EC. 
17 Article 58 of Directive 2008/8/EC of 12 February 2008 amending Directive 2006/112/EC. Digital services pro-
vided by service providers established in a third country (non-EU) to private consumers have been taxed according 
to the destination principle since 2003 (Article 57 of Directive 2006/112/EC, now Article 58 of Directive 
2008/8/EC). 
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of VAT on both digital B2C services and B2B supplies.18 We use the resulting consumption 
tax planning opportunities to validate our main findings in cross-sectional tests. For instance, 
there is anecdotal evidence that especially multinational digital service providers report sales 
primarily in their European subsidiaries in low VAT rate countries in order to sell their services 
in the European market at more competitive prices.19 
Recent proposals on EU level aim to improve the enforcement mechanism for B2B supplies of 
goods20 and a recent VAT package should implement provisions such that platforms are liable 
to collect and pay VAT on B2C imports.21 Examining the functioning of existing rules is there-
fore of utmost importance in order to evaluate the potential efficiency of new regulations. 
2.2. Effects of Consumption Taxes on Corporate Decisions 
Consumption taxes can affect firms’ output and their profitability in two ways. First, consump-
tion taxes may be partially borne by firms. Consumption taxes drive a wedge between the price 
consumers pay and the price producers receive and the incidence of consumption taxes depends 
on the relative elasticity of supply and demand (Fullerton and Metcalf 2002). A full pass-
through of the consumption tax burden to the final consumer occurs when demand is fully ine-
lastic. In contrast, if consumers are perfectly elastic22, the firm bears the full burden of the tax 
and its net of tax output will be lower than in a world without consumption taxes (Fullerton and 
Metcalf 2002, Alm et al. 2009). Several empirical studies focus on specific product markets 
and show that firms partially bear the consumption tax burden which is attributed to consumers’ 
price elasticities not being fully inelastic or supply not being fully elastic (Poterba 1996, Besley 
and Rosen 1999, Kenkel 2005).23 
If a firm bears part of the tax burden, the VAT constitutes a cost to the business.24 The conse-
quence is a lower surplus for firms to the extent of the unshifted tax burden and the incentive 
to avoid consumption taxes (Christensen et al. 2001, Fox et al. 2014). When firms expect a 
lower return, output should be negatively associated with consumption taxes also in a purely 
domestic setting. In an international setting, MNEs might report lower output in affiliates facing 
                                                          
18 OECD (2017a), p. 13; Hellerstein (2016); Lamensch (2016); Agrawal and Fox (2017). 
19 Scott (2015). 
20 European Commission (2017c); see van de Leur (2017) for some comments. 
21 Lamensch (2018). 
22 Studies on consumers’ purchasing behavior document that consumers are sensitive to consumption taxation 
(Goolsbee 2000; Einav et al. 2014; Ellison and Ellison 2009; Scanlan 2007; Anderson et al. 2010; and Baugh et 
al. 2014). 
23 Also see Harding et al. (2012); Kosonen (2015); and Yilmazkuday (2017). 
24 In a discussion of new proposals for cross-border B2B VAT rules, van de Leur (2017) points out that a compre-
hensive application of the destination principle possibly results in cash-flow disadvantages, thereby influencing 
profit margins of businesses operating across borders. 
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higher VAT rates given the return in these countries is lower since net prices must be adjusted 
downwards if the consumption tax burden is not fully shifted to consumers (Jacob et al. 2018).  
The impact of a firm’s VAT incidence is illustrated through the example in Figure 2. Assuming 
that company B is located in a country with a VAT rate of initially 20% and the rate now in-
creases to 30%, the company can increase the price proportional to the VAT increase such that 
the gross price is 260 (net price 200 plus 60 VAT) if the consumers are fully inelastic. In this 
case, the consumer bears the full burden of the VAT increase and company B’s net of VAT-
profit is 100 (=260-60-130+30). If, however, the consumer demand is perfectly elastic, com-
pany B is not able to increase the price after the VAT increase and will still only be able to 
charge a gross price of 240 which includes VAT of 55.38 (=(240/1.3)*30%). B then realizes a 
net profit of only 84.62 (=240-55.38-130+30). As a result, company B expects lower profits 
after the VAT increase and might adjust output accordingly. 
The second channel is firms manipulating output in order to avoid consumption taxes in a cross-
border context, where tax planning incentives arise from cross-border differences in VAT rates. 
In principle, sales reported in financial statements are assumed to be relatively non-manipulable 
since the location of (final) consumers is fixed (Dyreng and Markle 2016). Given an MNE has 
an affiliate in a specific market country, sales should thus be reported in the same country where 
the consumers are located. However, from a legal and financial reporting perspective, an MNE 
has the possibility to report cross-border service sales in any affiliate located in a different 
country than the consumer’s location if the respective affiliate becomes the contracting partner 
of the consumer in the course of the service transaction. There is no incentive to manipulate the 
location of reported sales at the affiliate level from a consumption tax perspective if the desti-
nation principle is consistently enforced (i.e. VAT would be remitted where the final consumer 
is located). However, collecting consumption taxes is particularly challenging when firms use 
internet technologies to generate sales (Agrawal and Fox 2017, Agrawal 2017) and some firms 
offer services that do (or did) not fall under the destination principle such as B2C digital ser-
vices.  
Given an MNE delivers services that are taxed in the country where the service providing affil-
iate is incorporated (such as providing digital content), the consumption tax planning strategy 
would be to report revenue from cross-border digital service sales in countries with low VAT 
rates independently of where services are provided. Amazon used to channel the majority of its 
internet transactions through its European sales branch Amazon EU SARL, incorporated in 
Luxembourg providing VAT rates of 3% on electronic books and 15% on other services, thus 
11 
 
providing anecdotal evidence for consumption tax planning.25 The literature further suggests 
that U.S. electronic retailers (e-tailers), in contrast to brick-and-mortar businesses, avoid a tax-
able nexus when consumption taxes rise (Bruce et al. 2015) and therefore generate financial 
benefits (Hoopes et al. 2016). 
The evidence on the incidence of consumption taxes partially falling on firms and the tax plan-
ning incentives arising in the European VAT setting leads to our first hypothesis. 
H1: The reporting of sales by MNEs’ affiliates in the service sector is negatively associated 
with the value-added tax rate in the respective jurisdiction. 
2.3. Tax-motivated Income Shifting 
International taxation of corporate profits follows the separate entity principle, i.e. taxable prof-
its of an MNE’s affiliate in a given country depend on transfer prices for intercompany trans-
actions, which must conform to the arm’s length principle (Keuschnigg and Devereux 2013, 
OECD 2017b). Since income tax rates differ widely across countries, MNEs have an incentive 
to employ transfer pricing strategies within the range of the arm’s length principle such that 
pre-tax profits of an MNE’s group of affiliates are primarily reported in low tax countries. 
In a meta-analysis of prior empirical studies, Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017) calculate a 
semi-elasticity of profits with regard to corporate income taxes of 0.8 as a consensus measure 
and conclude that transfer pricing and licensing are much more relevant channels of profit shift-
ing than intracompany debt financing. Some recent studies explicitly examine different incen-
tives for profit shifting behavior across firms. De Simone (2016) finds that the adoption of IFRS 
is associated with stronger tax-motivated profit shifting which is explained by the fact that a 
wider set of benchmarks to defend transfer prices is available. De Simone et al. (2017) focus 
specifically on loss making affiliates and provide evidence that there is a shift-to-loss effect. 
Preliminary results by Chen et al. (2017) suggest that profit shifting out of high-tax countries 
decreases after the introduction of reduced income tax rates on income related to intellectual 
property (innovation boxes).  
Apart from these studies, there is little evidence on cross-sectional differences in profit shifting 
behavior such as industry-specific opportunities or constraints.26 Limited evidence supports the 
                                                          
25 The Court of Justice of the EU repealed the excessively low rate in March 2015 forcing an increase in Luxem-
bourg’s VAT rate on all revenue from digital services to 15%. See the exemplary media coverage of Amazon and 
its sale of ebooks through Luxembourg (The Guardian (online) 24 October 2012, and The Guardian (online) 23 
May 2015). 
26 Typically, empirical studies apply industry-fixed effects in order to control for unobservable features that may 
drive the results. But none of the studies reviewed investigates industry-specific shifting behaviour. 
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OECD’s claim that intangible assets facilitate more aggressive profit shifting (Grubert 2003, 
Beer and Loeprick 2015). Klassen et al. (2014) are the first to provide evidence that firms in 
the digital economy might engage more actively in corporate income tax planning. They de-
velop a model of electronic commerce reducing the cost of profit shifting and empirically snow 
that U.S.-based multinational manufacturing firms with a high share of sales generated elec-
tronically (i.e. high e-commerce intensity) report significantly lower cash effective tax rates at 
the consolidated parent level. 
Inferring from the extant literature on income tax-motivated profit shifting that documents a 
negative association of MNEs’ reported profits and corporate income taxes, we conjecture that 
MNEs active in the service industry are also sensitive to corporate income tax rates (Hebous 
and Johannesen 2016). Given the fact that prices at arm’s length are often difficult to observe 
for services and intangible assets (OECD 2017b, De Simone et al. 2017), we expect that service 
suppliers have a leeway to shift profits across locations and expect to confirm results of prior 
empirical investigations (see Heckemeyer and Overesch 2017). 
Our study aims to identify whether income tax-motivated profit shifting depends on MNEs’ 
response to consumption taxes. The extent to which firms are sensitive to consumption taxes 
(VAT) with respect to reporting output (sales) should affect profit shifting behavior due to the 
fact that sales are a main determinant of reported pre-tax profits (precursor in the income state-
ment). Research on tax planning behavior of firms facing opportunities to optimize both types 
of the firm’s ultimate tax burden is scarce. Swenson (2001) is the first to document that firms 
show a strong objective to reduce non-income taxes, which in turn alters their transfer pricing 
strategies used to minimize direct taxes. Robinson (2012) examines non-income taxes (includ-
ing consumption taxes), their determinants and the relation to income tax planning and tax 
compliance. She conjectures that firms who engage in income tax avoidance may also try to 
avoid non-income taxes and empirically finds a positive association of income tax planning 
activities and non-income taxes paid. In a recent study, Blouin et al. (2018) investigate U.S. 
MNEs’ cross-border transfer pricing strategies and consider that transfer prices do not only 
determine corporate income tax bases but also form the tax base for import duties. For instance, 
optimizing the MNE group’s CIT liability would require charging a high transfer price from 
the U.S. to the importing country but at the same time, this strategy might be adverse if the 
importing country charges high import duties.27 This finding is consistent with a substantial 
                                                          
27 Blouin et al. (2018) analyze the association of reported pre-tax profits of foreign affiliates with profit tax incen-
tives measured as the tax rate differential in the presence of conflicting incentives from custom duties and find that 
profit shifting is attenuated when custom duties and income taxes cannot be jointly minimized, i.e. the higher the 
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fraction of firms (21 percent) surveyed by EY indicating to take custom issues fully into account 
in their transfer pricing strategy. Even more firms (27 percent) state that VAT considerations 
affect their transfer pricing decisions (Ernst & Young 2013). 
Similar to Blouin et al. (2018), we argue that income tax-motivated profit shifting is weaker 
when firms integrate the incentive to minimize another type of tax. The intuition is that an 
MNE’s affiliate might have reported sales in order to manage VAT (active tax avoidance in the 
international setting) or in response to an increased tax burden as a major tax planning objective 
(tax incidence). The level of sales as a major driver of pre-tax profits is thus determined under 
consumption tax considerations and might not be optimal from a transfer pricing perspective. 
As a result, the opportunities to shift profits out of high CIT rate or into low CIT rate countries 
are constrained. Profit shifting becomes more costly under consumption tax planning since all 
remaining profit shifting activity rests on the cost side of internal trade. We therefore hypothe-
size the following. 
H2: The negative association between reported pre-tax profits and income tax rates is attenu-
ated for firms with a higher consumption tax rate sensitivity w.r.t. reporting sales. 
3. Research Design and Data 
3.1. Sales Reporting and Consumption Taxes 
We begin our empirical investigation with affiliates’ sales reporting behavior in response to 
VAT. We draw on the industrial economics literature, which examines the input productivity 
of labor and capital assets with respect to firm value added (sales). The function relates output 
(measured by sales) to input in the form of labor, capital assets and country-specific economic 
conditions (GDP, indexed consumer price level, and inflation rate) in the form of a transformed 
Cobb-Douglas production function. In the vein of Brynjolffson and Hitt (2003), who add com-
puter capital stock as an input variable next to ordinary capital stock and labor,28 we augment 
this empirical specification by including VAT as a potential explanatory variable of sales. 
ሺ1ሻ LogSalesit ൌ  
α0 ൅ α1VATit ൅ α2CITit ൅ α3Multii * VATit ൅ α4Multii * CITit ൅ α5Ttc_cit  
൅ α6LogPexpit ൅ α7LogAssetsit ൅ α8LogGDPit ൅ α9LogConsPriceit ൅ α10Inflationit ൅FE ൅ ε  
                                                          
after-tax duty burden (the income tax differential) relative to the income tax differential (the after-tax duty burden), 
the more (less) stringent the conflict of incentives. 
28 See Cardona et al. (2013) for an overview. They document that studies on (factor) productivity at the firm-level 
apply similar specifications with sales/revenues as the dependent variable. 
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We employ firm fixed effects to account for unobserved firm-specific characteristics that are 
constant over time such as firm-specific productivity attributes, the consumer price elasticity a 
firm faces, or its propensity towards tax planning. This fixed effects strategy leads to an identi-
fication of firms’ response to consumption taxes through tax rate changes over time. We further 
use year fixed effects to control for time trends causing differences in the level of reported sales. 
We also include the CIT rate to control for any income tax-motivated sales reporting behavior. 
We cluster standard errors at the affiliate-level. Our main coefficient of interest in equation (1) 
is α1, which accounts for the response of firm output to the value-added tax rate. We expect a 
negative sign of the coefficient since we conjecture that firm output negatively reacts to VAT 
rate increases. To account for cross-sectional differences in behavior, we include interaction 
terms of the cross-sectional indicator variable and tax rates. In our first set of tests, we specifi-
cally test for a differential behavior of foreign-owned firms, denoted by Multi. 
The identifying assumption is that a change in the level of an affiliate’s reported sales is caused 
by the VAT rate change in a given country and not by other confounding factors that might be 
associated with this change in tax policy. A primary concern could be that the conjectured neg-
ative association is driven by unobserved variation in economic conditions that are likely to 
affect tax policy rendering the variation in VAT rates endogenous. To mitigate this concern, we 
exploit 32 changes in VAT rates in opposite directions, at different points in time, and across 
different countries. This setting of staggered tax policy changes provides for treated and un-
treated countries throughout the sample period. Since we focus on affiliates in the European 
Union only, we are confident to observe changes in reported sales caused by VAT rate changes 
since the group of untreated affiliates in countries without tax rate changes serve as counterfac-
tuals facing similar economic conditions since we control for a country’s GDP (see e.g. Heider 
and Ljungqvist 2015). Since responses in reported sales (output) to VAT rate changes might be 
driven by altering consumer demand after VAT rate changes, we include indexed consumer 
price levels29 to mitigate the concern of omitted variable bias and to disentangle the changes in 
reported sales attributable to firms’ response to VAT from consumer market effects. Another 
concern would be that an MNE’s affiliate location choice is endogenous (i.e. affected by tax 
factors) leading to a sample selection bias. We assume a firm’s group structure and affiliate 
locations to be fixed in our setting in which tax changes are exploited via managing tax bases 
                                                          
29 Price level indices are based on price level differences across countries (drawing on purchasing power parities) 
and express the price level of consumer goods and services in a given country relative to the average of EU28 
countries. We use the sector specific price level indices for “total services” provided by Eurostat (2018b). 
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since firm-group boundaries change slowly and can be considered exogenous in the short term 
(Khanna and Yafeh 2005). 
To further corroborate any effect of consumption taxes on firms’ output, we employ a more 
stringent model in subsequent analyses including country-year fixed effects. This strategy ac-
counts for any time-varying shocks that might be heterogeneous across countries and affect tax 
policy and firm output simultaneously. Since VAT changes are absorbed by this type of fixed 
effects, we cannot identify a baseline effect of VAT on sales. Instead, we interact the VAT rate 
with the cross-sectional indicators to validate our baseline result. Any significant difference 
should be the result of cross-sectional differences in VAT incidence or tax planning behavior. 
3.2. Profit Shifting in the Presence of Consumption Taxes 
To test our second hypothesis, we empirically analyze whether firms integrate both types of 
taxes in their decision-making about tax planning and whether income tax avoidance via profit 
shifting is affected by a firm’s sensitivity to VAT with respect to reporting sales. We address 
this question by first analyzing a firm’s sales reporting behavior, which ultimately affects the 
level of pre-tax profits to be reported from a financial accounting perspective. 
We construct a VAT sensitivity measure that captures the firm-specific association between 
VAT and reported sales. We derive this measure by running a regression based on equation (1) 
(excluding interaction terms) with VAT interacted with the firm-level fixed effects vector.30 
The firm-specific VAT sensitivity is then the point estimate for a firm’s fixed effect interacted 
with VAT. The result is multiplied by -1 and labelled ΔVAT. A positive value for ΔVAT thus 
indicates a negative relationship between VAT rates and firms’ reported sales. This measure 
operationalizes our notion of a firm-level consumption tax sensitivity. We augment established 
profit shifting models in the tax and accounting literature31 by including the firm-specific VAT 
sensitivity as an explanatory variable and interact it with the CIT rate. In particular, we adapt 
the model developed by Hines and Rice (1994)32 to estimate the effect of the CIT rate on affil-
iates’ reported profits. Our specification follows the typical design using year and firm fixed 
effects. 
                                                          
30 This fixed effects regression including interaction is implemented in Stata using the high dimensional fixed 
effects regression estimator by Correia (2016). 
31 Numerous studies on tax-motivated income shifting build on the research design developed by Grubert and 
Mutti (1993) and Hines and Rice (1994) (extended by Huizinga and Laeven (2008)). Recent studies on the effect 
of income taxes on firms’ profit reporting also include Klassen and Laplante (2012); Dharmapala and Riedel 
(2013); Dyreng and Markle (2016); and Dowd et al. (2017). 
32 Similar empirical specifications providing evidence consistent with income tax-motivated profit shifting are also 
used by De Simone (2016) and Blouin et al. (2018). Since the sample in this paper only includes MNE affiliates 
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ሺ2ሻ LogEbitit ൌ  
β0 ൅ β1CITit ൅ β2VATit ൅ β3ΔVATi ൅ β4ΔVATi * CITit ൅ β5ΔVATi *VATit  
൅ β6LogPexpit ൅ β7LogAssetsit ൅ β8LogGDPit ൅FE ൅ ε      
We employ firm fixed effects to control for unobserved variation on the affiliate-level that 
might influence tax responses and financial reporting choices.33 We further include year fixed 
effects to control for unobserved variation over time that affects all affiliates in the sample 
equally. Our coefficient of interest in equation (2) is β4, which accounts for the differential 
effect of CIT on LogEBIT depending on the level of the firm-specific VAT sensitivity with 
regards to sales reporting. We expect a positive sign of the estimate since we conjecture that 
profit shifting behavior is attenuated when firms are sensitive to VAT when reporting sales 
(β4>0).  
3.3. Sample Selection and Variable Definitions 
We use financial information on the affiliate-level of MNEs over the period 2007 to 2015 from 
the Amadeus database provided by Bureau van Dijk to empirically test our hypotheses.34 The 
database provides unconsolidated financial statement and ownership information for independ-
ent and affiliated European firms as well as a detailed industry classification (4-digit NACE 
Codes).  
Our sample consists of active subsidiaries, i.e. affiliates of a group of companies, in the service 
industry. We categorize service affiliates according to the respective NACE Rev. 2 codes.35 We 
download financial information from Amadeus for affiliates in the service sector with uncon-
solidated financial accounts, ultimately owned by a global parent, and with information on re-
ported sales and total assets in at least one of the years from 2013 to 2016. We further limit the 
sample to firms with available information on sales and personnel expenses or the number of 
employees for the year 2015. To cover only firms with at least some tax planning opportunities 
we drop observations with less than 500,000 Euro in sales and at least 10,000 Euro in total 
assets and personnel expense. We further drop observations for which total shareholder funds 
                                                          
in the service sector, we use the CIT rate at face value that might drive firms’ reporting behavior instead of the tax 
incentive variable put forward by Huizinga and Leaven (2008). 
33 Our preferred specification deviates from other traditional models such as the one of De Simone (2016) and 
Blouin et al. (2018) in that we replace industry by firm fixed effects to ensure profit shifting responses to CIT 
changes are not driven by any omitted, time-invariant firm characteristics that are not absorbed by industry-specific 
factors. 
34 Coverage for 2016 is low due to the time lag of including available financial data in the Amadeus database. 
35 We include firms operating in the services industry with their main activities in one of the following classifica-
tions based on NACE Rev. 2 codes: 454, 461, 479, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 77, 
78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 8559, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96. For a detailed description of industry segments, see European 
Communities (2008). This also means we require an industry classification (NACE) code available in the data. 
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are negative in all years (this eliminates especially small firms), which have a missing or above 
1 leverage ratio (insolvent firms), with EBIT over sales margins of greater 1 or smaller -1, and 
which have an effective tax rate of greater than 100 percent or smaller than -100 percent (im-
plausible observations). Since we complement our tests of consumption taxes on firm output 
with an analysis on the MNE-group level, the regressions are based on affiliates which we can 
link to an MNE-group based on its global ultimate owner (GUO). Further limiting the sample 
to affiliates in EU member states and with positive values for EBIT yields 316,900 affiliate-
year observations (Table 1). These cover 78,954 unique affiliates with 63,958 global ultimate 
owners. 
All variables are defined in Table 2. We analyze reported sales, measured as the natural loga-
rithm of sales, LogSales, and reported pre-tax profits by earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT, pre-tax income), measured as the natural logarithm of EBIT, LogEbit, on the affiliate-
level. Our tax measures as the variables of interest are the country-year value-added tax rate, 
VAT, and the country-year corporate income tax rate, CIT. The other independent variables 
reflect firm and country characteristics. Our proxy for labor is personnel expenditure, LogPexp. 
To proxy for capital we use total assets, LogAssets. We measure the gross domestic product 
(GDP) as the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in current prices, LogGDP, provided by the 
Worldbank. LogConsPrice refers to the natural logarithm of comparative (indexed) consumer 
price levels (for the total service sector) and Inflation refers to the country-specific rate of in-
flation in Europe, both available from Eurostat. Since compliance is considered a major burden 
with respect to remitting consumption taxes (Bal 2017, European Commission 2016), we also 
include a proxy for the compliance cost, measured as the time to comply in hours per year, 
Ttc_ct, provided by the Worldbank and PwC. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 reports summary statistics of the regression analyses. Our sample of 316,900 affiliate-
year observations has average sales of € 20.92 million and EBIT of € 1.85 million over the 
period 2007-2015. The sample firms report average personnel expenditures of € 4.36 million 
and total assets of € 28.99 million. In Table 4, we provide a correlation matrix that includes 
most of our variables. The correlation between VAT and Sales is negative (-0.031), suggesting 
that VAT is negatively associated with output and thus providing some preliminary support of 
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our first hypothesis. The correlation between CIT and Ebit is negative (-0.008), indicating firms 
report lower pre-tax profits in countries with higher corporate income tax rates. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The average CIT rate amounts to 31.01% and the average VAT rate across country-years is 
20.60%. Table 13 in the Online Appendix shows the CIT and VAT rate changes in percentage 
points over the period 2007 to 2015 for our 24 sample countries. In total, we observe 72 stag-
gered tax rate changes providing a favorable setting for identification. Panel A of Table 13 
documents 4 decreases and 28 increases of the VAT rate. Panel B of Table 13 documents 32 
decreases and 8 increases of the CIT rate. Changes in the VAT and CIT rate occur in different 
years, in different countries and in opposite directions. Hence, the tax rate changes are staggered 
in time across countries. 
We are confident to capture the majority of service providers generating sales to external parties 
in Europe when comparing the total sales of affiliates classified as offering information and 
communications services (NACE 58-63) in our sample to the consolidated statistics for this 
segment provided by Eurostat.36 Table 14 in the Online Appendix shows that our dataset cap-
tures a larger amount of sales than the consolidated statistics of Eurostat that, for instance, has 
no information on services sales in Ireland. We thus believe our sample to be representative for 
the European service sector. Yet, the larger amount of aggregated sales in the sample might 
also be driven by us capturing intracompany sales, i.e. sales from services offered to other firms 
of the same multinational group.  
4.2. Sales Reporting and Consumption Taxes 
Baseline Results 
Table 5 reports the results of estimating service affiliates’ sales reporting response to VAT rate 
changes (equation (1)). All specifications in Table 5 include firm and year fixed effects. Column 
(1) in Table 5 first reports results of estimating a standard production function. Intuitively, the 
coefficients on LogPexp, LogAssets and LogGDP are all positive and significant. The negative 
and significant coefficient on LogConsPrice suggests that reported sales decrease in consumer 
price levels (elasticity of around 0.22) hinting at a somewhat elastic consumer demand, i.e. 
higher consumer prices translate into lower output (firms’ sales) if they face non-zero demand 
                                                          
36 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Information_and_communication_ser-
vice_statistics_-_NACE_Rev._2. 
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elasticity. Changes in consumer prices should capture consumer-market effects of VAT rate 
changes that explain changes in output because of a lower expected surplus if firms bear part 
of the consumption tax burden. Any direct effect of VAT on reported sales should thus be at-
tributable to firms’ consumption tax response. The positive and significant coefficient on Infla-
tion suggests that an increase in overall price levels also inflates sales. 
Consistent with our first hypothesis, we find a statistically significant and negative association 
of service affiliates’ reported sales and value-added tax rates across all specifications. In our 
preferred specification (column (3)), we also control for the CIT rate and the coefficient esti-
mate of the VAT rate is significant at the 1% level. The result indicates that a one percentage 
point increase in the VAT rate is associated with a reduction in affiliates’ reported sales of 0.52 
percent. In column (4), we test for a differential sales reporting behavior of foreign-owned firms 
by including the interaction of VAT and CIT with Multi. We find that firms’ sales response to 
VAT is attenuated for firms with a foreign parent indicating that multinationals bear less of 
local taxes in line with recent evidence on investments and consumption taxes (Jacob et al. 
2018).37 Interestingly, the significantly negative effect of the CIT rate on reported sales is driven 
by foreign-owned firms, which suggests that these MNEs anticipate a higher income tax burden 
(or a higher cost of shifting profits out of the affiliate) when reporting higher sales.38 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
VAT Planning by Digital Firms 
Column (5) of Table 5 reports results of our first test exploring the mechanisms of the effect of 
VAT on output of digital firms. The institutional background in the European Union provided 
the opportunity to engage in consumption tax planning through reporting sales in locations with 
lower VAT rates. One of the major characteristics of digital service providers is the flexibility 
of the business models (Barrett et al. 2015), which is enabled by technology and digital plat-
forms through which such businesses distribute their services (Amit and Zott 2001). Digital 
service firms (e.g. online gambling or streaming platforms) are particularly flexible in their way 
of accessing markets via the internet without having a physical presence in each country39 
(Cockfield 2002, p. 607; Agrawal and Fox 2017, European Commission 2017b) and should 
                                                          
37 The coefficients are jointly significant (p<0.01), while the sum of the coefficients is significant only at the 10% 
level (p=0.101).  
38 The coefficients are jointly significant (p<0.01) and the sum of the coefficients (-0.3096) is significant as well 
(p<0.01). 
39 The distribution of such services, i.e. the transportation of information goods, is nearly cost-less and is inde-
pendent of the consumer’s location such that providers are flexible in choosing the location of servers and other 
resources (Petruzzi and Buriak 2018). 
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thus be capable of exploiting opportunities of VAT planning. With digital services being taxa-
ble in the origin country, VAT can be a potential competitive factor40 since digital service pro-
viders can realize higher after-VAT sales and profits when reporting sales in jurisdictions with 
a lower VAT rate (Lamensch 2017, p. 138). Fearing unfair competition stemming from inade-
quate VAT collection, European policy makers are concerned especially given the increasing 
digital services market in the B2C segment, and have changed the provisions.41 While the des-
tination principle also applies to digital services provided to private consumers in the EU since 
2015 and thus repeals the differential tax incentive, enforcement of the new regulation and 
hence the collection of the VAT on digital services is considered insufficient.42 
We use an indicator variable Digital equal to one if the affiliate is active in one of the digital 
service industry segments, i.e. industries that are characterized by non-physical, electronic ser-
vice activities that are likely to be provided in the B2C sector. Digital B2C services include 
online publishing services such as e-books, online games, online gambling, web portals and 
music and video streaming or other content downloads. We thereby focus on NACE codes 
within information and communications services (NACE 58-63), renting of videos and tapes 
(NACE 7722), gambling and betting activities (9200) and other services that are likely to be 
provided via the internet (see Table 15 in the Online Appendix).43 
                                                          
40 Although the VAT is an item in transit and, thus, does not appear on a firm’s financial statement, the competitive 
advantage of VAT planning through sales reporting in low VAT countries is twofold. On the one hand, firms can 
charge lower gross consumers prices (Lamensch 2017, p. 138) while still generating the same net revenue. On the 
other hand, equal gross prices can be charged while generating higher net sales (Christensen et al. 2001; Hoopes 
et al. 2016). See Figure 4 in the Online Appendix for a simple calculation of the competitive advantage of cross-
border digital over domestic digital service providers. 
41 European Commission (2014), p. 32. The unbalanced value-added taxation contributed to an estimated VAT 
gap of EUR 170 billion in 2013 (European Parliament 2016, p. 67). The European Commission also estimates that 
EUR 5 billion of VAT revenues are lost each year due to non-compliance on cross-border online sales (European 
Commission 2016). The Commissioner responsible for Taxation and Customs László Kovács noted: "I am content 
that the change in the rules on the place of supply of services will ensure a more even playing field for businesses 
supplying services throughout the Community. This is particularly true of services which can be supplied at a 
distance where, as a result of current rules, businesses have been locating in countries with lower VAT rates. As 
a result, Member States have seen their revenues eroded." The provisions “[…] aimed at changing the rules on 
VAT so as to ensure that VAT on services accrues to the country where consumption occurs, and to prevent dis-
tortions of competition between Member States operating different VAT rates”. (European Commission 2008). 
42 Agrawal and Fox (2017); Lamensch (2017); Bal (2015), p. 251; OECD (2015); Waerzeggers (2015), p. 138. 
Also see the annual report of the German Supreme Audit Institution for a critique on the allegedly dysfunctional 
control mechanisms (Bundesrechnungshof 2015, item 82). 
43 Manual screening of this sample revealed that we cover prominent affiliates of MNEs that offer digital services 
such as video streaming, gaming, and online gambling or running online platforms such as search engines and 
marketplaces. According to the industry classification used in this paper, approximately 9 percent of the service 
provider affiliates in our sample offer digital services and thus generate sales through online channels. 
21 
 
We find a significantly stronger effect for the subset of digital service providers.44 Given a 
statistically significant coefficient of around -0.84 on the interaction term, the negative associ-
ation between reported sales and the VAT more than doubles for affiliates providing digital 
services. A one percentage point increase in VAT rates is associated with a decrease in service 
affiliates’ reported sales of around 1.66 percent. These findings are consistent with the expec-
tation that affiliates of digital service providers have a strong incentive to report sales in low 
VAT rate countries by exploiting the planning opportunities stemming from differentials in 
consumption taxation.45  
Cross-sectional Tests: Industries 
Next, we investigate the heterogeneity in the consumption tax response across firms. In these 
cross-sectional tests, we employ a more stringent estimation approach using country-year fixed 
effects to control for unobserved variation in economic conditions or policies at the country-
level that may be correlated with VAT changes. Using this econometric approach, we can only 
estimate the coefficient on the interaction between cross-sectional industry indicators and the 
VAT rate. Resorting to the firm fixed effects structure as in equation (1), however, yields com-
parable results suggesting that our baseline specification successfully controls for unobserved 
variation in economic conditions and regulatory policies across countries. Results of estimating 
equation (1) including industry indicators interacted with VAT and using country-year fixed 
effects instead of only controlling for GDP are reported in Table 6.46 As a baseline, we report 
the average affect excluding industry interactions in column (1) of Table 6. 
We expect firms of four specific sub-categories to exhibit different responses depending on the 
impact of VAT on firms’ cash flows and profitability. First, we again examine firms active in 
the digital services sector and confirm the results from our main analysis that digital service 
affiliates’ sales are more responsive to VAT (column (2) of Table 6). Second, we classify affil-
iates in the non-digital B2C services sector that are presumably highly exposed to end-consum-
ers and could face a substantial part of the VAT burden falling on them in case end-consumers 
are price-sensitive. Further, those affiliates are always liable to VAT in the country of their 
                                                          
44 The coefficients are jointly significant (p<0.01) and the sum of the coefficients (-1.6622) is significant as well 
(p<0.01). 
45 The findings relate to the analysis of newspaper articles on U.S. firms by Agrawal and Fox (2017) finding that 
digital firms have reduced both VAT and CIT liabilities by reporting tax bases in low tax countries. Fox et al. 2014 
document that companies in the online sector actively avoid consumption taxes in the U.S. market. 
46 With this specification, we can only estimate the coefficient on the interaction between the cross-sectional var-
iable and VAT. 
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incorporation (origin principle) which provides another reason why they should be more sensi-
tive to VAT changes in their country. We denote those B2C affiliates by B2C_non-digital. Re-
sults are reported in column (3) of Table 6 and show that B2C firms react more negatively to 
VAT rate increases consistent with our expectation. 
We then create proxies for affiliates providing services primarily intra-MNE and in the B2B 
sector and argue that these firms should respond less to consumption taxes. We do expect no 
VAT effect on output for B2B service providers or intra-group service units since any VAT 
payment is always refunded at the service-receiving firm level and, thus, does not translate into 
an ultimate financial burden. Technically, any consumer of a B2B service receives a VAT input 
credit and the VAT payment on that sale, both to external B2B consumers or to another firm of 
the same MNE, does not translate into an ultimate financial burden although the liability to 
remit VAT by the vendor constitutes a negative cash-flow effect as it is a significant cash-
outflow.47  
However, Rozema (2018) argues that the principle of the consumption tax incidence may be 
extended to firms along the B2B supply chain, where market power among the agents deter-
mines the relative burden.48 Applying this to our example of company B in Figure 2 may look 
the following. Carrying part of the VAT burden means that company B is less profitable and 
consequently will either reduce output or try to reduce its input costs. Reducing the input costs 
may be possible either by changing production factors or by further passing on the VAT burden. 
That is, company B could force a lower price for its input materials it receives from company 
A, which depends on the relative market power compared to company A. Ultimately, the burden 
would be passed on to the B2B retailer company A. B2B service affiliates are classified based 
on their industry classification including agents of sale, wholesale, transportation of freight and 
storage, among other (NACE segments 46, 49, 50, 52, 77 (except 7722), 78, 81, and 82), and 
are denoted by B2B. Column (4) of Table 6 presents the results for B2B service affiliates. Con-
sistent with our expectation, the effect of the VAT rate on these firms’ sales is close to zero for 
this group of firms.  
                                                          
47 Van de Leur (2017). 
48 He investigates how the burden of consumption taxes is shared between upstream and downstream firms con-
sidering cigarette wholesale prices and finds that downstream firms selling the cigarettes bear a smaller portion of 
the firm share of the tax burden. 
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If our sample firms offer intra-group services to another affiliate of the same MNE their reported 
sales should not be affected by VAT.49 We proxy for intracompany sales in our analysis to test 
whether such firms respond to VAT changes given the underlying mechanisms of tax incidence 
or strategic planning. We derive a proxy for intra-group service sales using information on the 
parent firm. We assume affiliates provide intra-group services if the parent firm is a manufac-
turing firm, i.e. if the ultimate parent is not classified as service provider itself nor as a holding 
company, and denote these affiliates by Intrafirm.50 Consistent with VAT on these services 
being refunded within the same MNE group, Column (5) of Table 6 finds an even positive 
coefficient on the interaction between Intrafirm and VAT, which might hint at the B2B sector 
becoming relatively more attractive when consumption taxes decrease firm profits in the B2C 
sector.  
Taken together, the results from the cross-sectional analyses support our hypothesis on firms’ 
output being negatively affected by consumption taxes and the mechanisms underlying this 
behaviour (that is, tax incidence and consumption tax planning). Our baseline result of a VAT 
semi-elasticity of around 0.5 might actually be the lower bound of the true effect for service 
firms for two reasons. First, the baseline results capture B2B and intra-group sales that, in iso-
lation, exhibit no response to VAT changes. Second, in case B2C services are offered free-of-
charge and sales are generated by other B2B transactions such as advertisements (i.e. like in the 
Google business model), we again would include B2B sales in our estimations for which VAT 
is not an ultimate financial disadvantage. Thus, these concerns should be a bias against finding 
significant results regarding the association of VAT and reported sales based on the baseline 
specification. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Cross-sectional Tests: Industries and Market Share 
Theory suggests that consumption tax incidence depends on the relative elasticity of supply and 
demand. The consumption tax responsiveness may thus vary across firms that face different 
levels of the elasticity of demand. To test this phenomenon, we rerun our cross-sectional tests 
based on the industry interactions and include a proxy for demand elasticity. We use a firm’s 
                                                          
49 There are two reasons. First, such a transaction constitutes a B2B transaction through which the buyer is granted 
an input tax deduction for the VAT remitted by the seller. Second, in many countries a group of companies can 
apply for joint filing through which only sales to external parties are liable to VAT. 
50 Examples of affiliates providing intra-group services include e.g. Mercedes-Benz G GMBH (AT), whose par-
ent is classified as manufacturer of motor vehicles (NACE 2910) and Newell Rubbermaid UK LIMITED (GB), 
whose parent is classified as manufacturer of plastic products (NACE 2229). 
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share of total assets in total industry assets as a proxy.51 We construct an indicator variable, 
Highassetshare, equal to one if a firm’s share of total assets in total assets of the industry using 
2-digit NACE codes is above the highest quartile of the asset share distribution by country and 
year. Similar to Jacob et al. (2018), who use a firm’s size to proxy for demand elasticity, we 
argue that a firm’s share of total assets can be a proxy for its market share and thereby for the 
size of a firm’s output market and its market power. Firms with a higher market share may act 
as price setters and face less elastic demand. Results are reported in Table 7.  
The average effect excluding industry interactions is reported in column (1) of Table 7. We find 
that the negative effect of consumption taxes on firms’ reported sales is attenuated for firms 
with a relatively high market share consistent with those firms facing less elastic demand (Jacob 
et al. 2018). The results in columns (2) to (5) suggest that the overall effects for the different 
industries are comparable to our findings of the industry-cross-sections from Table 6. In con-
trast to the overall effect of the average sample firm, we find that digital service firms and B2C 
firms are more responsive to VAT if they have a high market share (significant and negative 
coefficient on the triple interaction). We interpret this result as evidence for a bigger opportunity 
to gain a competitive advantage from engaging in consumption tax planning through sales re-
porting given their bigger size (and thus, sales). These firms have larger opportunities to exploit 
the origin principle, i.e. report sales at affiliates that face relatively lower VAT rates. The group 
of intra-group service firms does not show any differential behavior, which is consistent with 
these firms not being affected by consumption taxes given they are not engaging in external 
sales. The significant and positive coefficient for B2B firms shows that part of the overall pos-
itive response of this industry is driven by those B2B firms with a high market share. This also 
supports the argument that market power among the agents in the supply chain does matter. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Additional Tests: Group-level Analysis 
We employ a separate test to corroborate that our findings are driven by MNE firms’ consump-
tion tax planning considerations in terms of exploiting the origin principle (digital and B2C 
firms) and accounting for the incidence of the tax burden (all firms). We replace the dependent 
variable of the firm-level analysis by the aggregate, group-wide sales. LogGroupsales is the 
sum of reported sales of all affiliates in the sample that belong to the same MNE in a given 
                                                          
51 Previous studies have used a firm’s profit margin to approximate its position concerning demand elasticity (Ler-
ner 1934; Aghion et al. 2005; Kubick et al. 2015; Jacob et al. 2018). Since we examine how consumption taxes 
affect a firm’s output measured by sales, a variable such as profit margin may create concerns of endogeneity, so 
we refrain from using it in our analyses. 
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year. For this analysis, we restrict the sample to firm-year observations for which we observe 
at least two affiliates belonging to the same MNE.52 The dummy variable Intl distinguishes 
between domestic groups and MNEs within the sample that are incorporated in different coun-
tries.  
If firms respond to changing incentives from VAT, they might shift reported sales from one 
country to another country if they have this arbitrage opportunity. Two forces can drive such 
behavior. First, selling to customers in a different country becomes relatively more profitable 
if the VAT rate increases in a given country where the affiliate selling to local customers bears 
part of an increased VAT rate. Second, digital and B2C firms might exploit the origin principle 
in response to a VAT rate change in a given country and sell to the same customers from a 
different location with a more attractive VAT rate. In both cases, we would expect overall group 
sales to remain constant for firms with these international consumption tax opportunities. Do-
mestic service groups, however, are affected by the changes in VAT rate with no (short-term) 
reporting strategies other than adjusting output in the opposite direction of the VAT change.  
We use LogGroupsales as the dependent variable and augment equation (1) by interacting VAT 
with Intl. The baseline results (column (1) of Table 8) confirm our main results and show that 
also the group-wide sales negatively respond to VAT rate increases. The highly significant and 
positive coefficient on the interaction term of VAT and Intl is consistent with service MNEs 
engaging in consumption tax planning. This result is consistent with our finding that multina-
tionals bear local taxes to a lesser extent (column (4) of Table 5) and suggests that MNEs in-
crease output in locations with relatively lower VAT rates to a greater extent that they decrease 
output in locations where VAT rates increase.  
We further extend this analysis and account for a differential behavior of firms within the four 
industries (Digital, B2C_non-digital, Intrafirm, and B2B). Again, we employ a more stringent 
estimation approach and use country-year fixed effects. Column (2) confirms our result for the 
baseline effect that aggregated sales of international groups do not change or even overcom-
pensate in response to VAT rate changes. Columns (3) to (6) report the results. We can only 
document a differential behavior for the group of digital service firms. The strong negative 
reaction of digital service firms’ sales to VAT rate changes is still present but attenuated given 
a significant and positive coefficient on the triple-interaction term. The latter result corroborates 
                                                          
52 These estimations are therefore based on a smaller sample since we require multinational groups to have domes-
tic groups as counterfactuals. Other firm-year observations of our base sample belong to groups (see the sample 
selection process) but other group firms are not part of the sample. 
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the finding that digital firms shift reported sales to a firm located in another country when the 
VAT rate in the market location increases. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Additional Tests: Consumption Tax Planning and Profit Shifting Incentives 
In a preliminary test of whether consumption tax planning and corporate income tax-motivated 
profit shifting behavior are interrelated, we make use of the staggered implementation of VAT 
rate changes in our European sample over the period 2007 to 2015 to investigate whether firms 
anticipate the effect that consumption tax planning has on the corporate income tax base. So-
phisticated corporate tax planners might be aware of the fact that consumption tax planning 
places a constraint on exploiting profit shifting opportunities given that reported sales directly 
map into pre-tax profits. In particular, they might evaluate the benefits of responding to value-
added taxes via reporting sales against the potential costs of subsequent income taxation driven 
by the applicable CIT rate. If this is the case, an increase in the VAT rate should not invoke a 
negative sales response if the level of (subsequent) income taxation is relatively low. Accord-
ingly, firms might be particularly active in consumption tax planning if the associated effect on 
pre-tax income is congruent with the goal of income tax minimization. 
We modify equation (1) and replace the continuous measure VAT by indicator variables for tax 
rate changes, VATminus (VATplus) taking on the value of one if an affiliate experiences a VAT 
rate cut (increase) in the respective year and zero otherwise. We then interact these variables 
separately with an indicator for being located in a country with a low CIT rate, LowCIT. The 
indicator is equal to one if the CIT rate is below median of the sample or below 21%. This 
approach allows us to analyze whether firms’ sales response to VAT cuts and increases is asym-
metric and whether it depends on the CIT rate, which determines the (subsequent) level of profit 
taxation. Figure 5 in the Online Appendix shows that we exploit substantial variation since our 
sample consists of countries with both favorable (e.g. Bulgaria and Czech Republic) or unfa-
vorable (e.g. Portugal) CIT and VAT rates relative to the sample mean, and countries with either 
a relatively high CIT and low VAT rate (e.g. Spain and Germany) or vice versa (e.g. Hungary). 
Figure 6 further illustrates the variation exemplarily for the year 2015. 
We report results in Table 9. In column (1), we interact the indicators for VAT cuts and in-
creases with the indicator for a CIT rate below median and find a highly significant and positive 
coefficient on the interaction term of VATplus and LowCIT suggesting that firms’ reaction to 
VAT increases is attenuated when the CIT rate is sufficiently low. This suggests that affiliates 
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in countries with a CIT rate below the median over the entire sample period (31.4 percent)  do 
not negatively react to increases of the VAT rate when reporting sales. The coefficient on the 
interaction of VATminus and LowCIT cannot be reported in column (1) since VAT rate de-
creases are rare (only about 2,800 observations) and hardly occur for countries in our sample 
with a CIT rate below median. In column (2), we find similar results when LowCIT denotes that 
the CIT is below 21%. Firms’ negative response to VAT rate increases is attenuated (even 
overcompensated) when the CIT rate is below 21%. We also find that the positive response to 
VAT cuts is generally stronger and find no differential effect for the case that the CIT rate is 
low. These results suggest that the sales response to VAT rate increases is contingent on the 
CIT rate being sufficiently high.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
4.3. Profit Shifting in the Presence of Consumption Taxes 
Profit Shifting Behavior and Consumption Taxes 
Having established that firms’ output in terms of reported sales is sensitive to consumption 
taxes, we integrate this finding in the analysis of income tax-motivated profit shifting. Table 10 
reports the results of estimating the model of service affiliates’ pre-tax profit reporting response 
to changes of the CIT rate. All specifications include firm and year fixed effects. We first rep-
licate the baseline model established in prior literature (column (1)). In general, the magnitude 
of profit shifting across all specifications is consistent with earlier findings implying that profit 
shifting behavior in the service sector is similar to that of firms in other industries.53 For service 
providers, a one percentage point increase in CIT rates is associated with a decline in pre-tax 
profits of around 0.47 percent on average. When we also control for the VAT rate, we find a 
significant and negative association of pre-tax profits and the value-added tax rate (column (2)) 
suggesting that planning for consumption taxes affects reported pre-tax profits given sales are 
highly correlated with reported pre-tax profits. 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
The results of our analysis so far suggest that firms react to VAT rate changes in their sales 
reporting behavior and that firms consider income tax-related costs when planning on consump-
                                                          
53 Huizinga and Laeven (2008) estimate a coefficient of -0.595 in a similar specification, analogously Blouin et al. 
(2018) estimate -0.542. Consistently, coefficients on LogPexp, LogAssets and LogGDP are all positive and signif-
icant. 
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tion taxes. If the two tax policy parameters, the VAT and CIT rate, gauge conflicting tax man-
agement objectives exploiting a VAT rate cut through reporting higher sales could result in a 
cost due to a higher income tax burden or a higher cost of profit shifting. If, for example, a 
country’s tax system is characterized by a low VAT and a high CIT rate, reporting higher sales 
in response to the low VAT rate requires profit shifting to be employed in a more aggressive 
manner on the cost side of an intra-group transaction in order to minimize pre-tax profits in the 
same country.  
We investigate the dependence of profit shifting on the level of consumption tax responsiveness 
by including our measure of firm-specific VAT sensitivity54 with regards to sales reporting and 
test whether the respective variation across firms explains differences in profit shifting behav-
ior. The variable ΔVAT gauges the affiliate-specific intensity of consumption tax planning with 
positive increasing values indicating a stronger consumption tax response. Columns (3) and (4) 
report results of our main tests of our second hypothesis (equation (2)). We report a significant 
positive coefficient on the interaction term of ΔVAT and CIT in both specifications suggesting 
that profit shifting is attenuated when firms respond to the VAT rate. We plot the marginal 
effects of the CIT rate on reported pre-tax profits in Figure 3 to allow for a direct interpretation 
depending on the level of ΔVAT. We find that only firms that do not negatively react to con-
sumption taxes (negative values for ΔVAT) engage in profit shifting (i.e. negative and statisti-
cally significant effect of CIT). To provide an additional test, we also include the interaction 
between ΔVAT and the VAT rate in column (4) and find a significantly positive coefficient 
consistent with the negative effect of VAT already being captured for the subgroup of firms 
with higher values of ΔVAT. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Overall, these results are novel to the profit shifting literature and suggest that differential profit 
shifting behavior can be explained by a firm’s consumption tax responsiveness. These findings 
imply that firms do not jointly minimize the tax burden from consumption and profit taxes but 
that managing the possible consumption tax burden in the first place constrains profit shifting. 
                                                          
54 We construct this measure by running a regression of sales on the CIT and VAT rates and the control variables 
as in specification (3) of Table 5 and interact the VAT rate with the vector of firm fixed effects. The point estimates 
on interaction terms yield the firm-specific VAT sensitivities with regards to sales reporting. We multiply the 
values by minus one and winsorize them at 1 and 99 percent. We use the high dimensional fixed effects regression 
estimator by Correia (2016). Given the large number of affiliates in the sample, the Stata-command REGHDFE is 
applied. The command drops singleton groups, i.e. in our case firm fixed effects with only one observation in the 
sample period, to avoid overstating statistical significance. Dropping singletons results in a slightly smaller sample 
of 299,901 affiliate-years. Table 16 in the Appendix reports results of using this estimation approach with and 
without interacting the VAT rate with firm fixed effects. We find that estimates are generally in line with our fixed 
effects regression using the standard approach (Table 5). 
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Our findings on the relationship between consumption tax planning and income shifting are 
consistent with those of Blouin et al. (2018) using a different setting to show that profit shifting 
behavior is attenuated when custom duties cannot jointly be minimized via transfer pricing. 
Cross-sectional Tests: Industries 
The recent public debate and anecdotal evidence suggest that firms in the digital economy en-
gage in particularly aggressive profit shifting (OECD 2015, European Commission 201455). 
Empirical studies document that MNEs report lower (higher) profits in high-tax (low-tax) af-
filiates if they have the opportunity to employ transfer pricing strategies based on the exploita-
tion of intellectual property (e.g. Harris 1993, Grubert 2003, Beer and Loeprick 2015). Further, 
intangible (and thus more mobile) assets are located in tax favorable jurisdictions to facilitate 
tax planning (e.g. Griffith et al. 2014). Primary value drivers of digital business models are the 
use of internet technologies, self-developed software and human capital-related organizational 
assets (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014) that are hardly captured by publicly available financial 
information.56 Apart from the evidence in Klassen et al. (2014), which is limited to the U.S. e-
commerce sector, we do not know whether firms in the digital sector of the economy are par-
ticularly active tax planners. We thus consider this an empirical question.  
In cross-sectional tests, we test for differential profit shifting behavior of service affiliates in 
the four industries as defined above. For these tests, we augment equation (2) by interacting the 
respective industry indicators (Digital, B2C_non-digital, Intrafirm, and B2B) with the CIT and 
the interaction term of the CIT and ΔVAT. Similar to our cross-sectional analyses on consump-
tion taxes and firms’ output, we employ country-year fixed effects to control for any economic 
conditions that are unobserved but possibly correlated with tax policy. Table 11 reports the 
regression results. We do not find evidence for a significantly different effect of the CIT rate 
on reported profits in case of digital service providers. We can, however, show that the attenu-
ation effect of the consumption tax sensitivity is somewhat stronger for digital service firms 
given a significant (10%-level) and positive coefficient on the triple-interaction term. However, 
                                                          
55 See e.g. Netflix paying only little corporation tax in the UK (The Guardian (online) 13 October 2016, available 
at https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/oct/13/netflix-uk-corporation-tax). The finance ministers of sev-
eral European Union (EU) countries recently claim that the current tax system is flawed, arguing MNEs pay only 
little tax in countries where they exploit consumer markets and rely on the local infrastructure. The Wall Street 
Journal (online) 21 September 2017, available at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-preps-tax-crackdown-on-sili-
con-valley-1505988538. Potential solutions to address the issue include mechanisms to tax MNEs based on the 
location of consumption rather than on book profits. Discussed instruments are an equalization tax on digital sales 
or extended withholding taxes. In a recent initiative, the finance ministers of the EU state that “[being] able to 
appropriately tax the companies operating in the digital economy is a major challenge for the European Union” 
and that effective solutions need to be employed quickly (EU2017 2017a; EU2017 2017b). 
56 Forms of intellectual property measured in prior empirical studies are mostly intangible assets, R&D, and patents 
and hence probably do not account for different forms of value drivers in digital business models. 
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the overall sum of the coefficients is not significant. Future research could address whether 
firms in the digital economy exploit tax planning channels that we cannot measure with the 
approach of estimating a standard production function. 
We document that profit shifting behavior of B2C service firms is comparable to that of digital 
service firms: the effect of the CIT rate on reported pre-tax profits is strongly attenuated for 
these firms (column (3)). For our sub-group of intra-group service providers, we do not find 
any differential behavior (column (4)). For B2B service affiliates, in contrast, we find that profit 
shifting behavior is not attenuated if firms are VAT sensitive. While the coefficient on the in-
teraction term of CIT and ΔVAT is significant and positive, this attenuation effect is eliminated 
for the B2B firms given the significant and negative coefficient on the triple interaction 
(B2B*CIT*ΔVAT).  
Overall, these cross-sectional results are consistent with the industry-specific findings on con-
sumption tax planning. They indicate that firms providing intra-group and B2B services have 
sufficient leeway in engaging in profit shifting even if they are sensitive to VAT changes. Their 
sensitivity to VAT changes as reported in Table 6, however, is much lower and thus their be-
havior towards consumption taxes is less restrictive for engaging in profit shifting. In sum, the 
results in Table 10 and Table 11 support our hypothesis that the negative association between 
reported pre-tax profits and income tax rates is attenuated for firms with a higher consumption 
tax rate sensitivity. 
[Insert Table 11 about here] 
Cross-sectional Tests: Interest Expense 
We additionally test whether firms resort to a different profit shifting channel when manipulat-
ing pre-tax profits for income tax purposes is constrained by consumption tax considerations. 
So far, we have effectively examined transfer pricing of intra-group trade (goods and services 
transactions) as one of the major channels of profit shifting since EBIT (or LogEbit) as the 
dependent variable captures such transfer pricing manipulations (e.g. Maffini and Mokkas 
2011, Heckemeyer and Overesch 2017). In addition to this channel, MNEs can use intra-group 
debt financing as an additional profit shifting channel. Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017) find 
that this financing channel accounts for around one third of income tax-motivated pre-tax profit 
shifting. 
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If a firm’s profit shifting behavior is restricted by its response to consumption taxes, the firm 
might increase intrafirm debt financing in order to optimize its income tax position. We opera-
tionalize this mechanism by estimating equation (2) with two different dependent variables. 
First, we use return on assets (RoA), measured as earnings before interest and taxes over total 
assets, as an alternative dependent variable. Second, we compare these results to an estimation 
of equation (2) using interest expense scaled by total assets (IntExpoA) as the dependent varia-
ble. IntExpoA is our measure to gauge the debt financing behavior of firms. We expect a positive 
coefficient on CIT since interest expenses should increase in response to CIT rate increases in 
order to shift pre-tax profits out of the respective jurisdiction (Grubert 1998, Desai et al. 2004).  
Results are presented in Table 12. We confirm our main finding on the relation of profit shifting 
and consumption tax sensitivity in column (1). The coefficient on the baseline effect of the CIT 
rate on RoA is significant and negative and the interaction term of the CIT and ΔVAT is signif-
icant and positive indicating the attenuation effect. When examining IntExpoA as the dependent 
variable, we find results consistent with our expectation (column (2)). The baseline effect of 
the CIT rate suggests that firms increase interest expenses when CIT rates increase. Given the 
positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term between CIT and ΔVAT, we find that 
this relationship is more pronounced when firms are more sensitive to VAT. This result indi-
cates that firms engage in profit shifting behavior via debt financing to a greater extent when 
the other channel of profit shifting, transfer pricing manipulation with respect to intra-group 
trade, is constrained by consumption tax considerations. We can confirm the results after con-
trolling for country-year fixed effects (columns (3) and (4)). Lastly, we augment our regression 
equation and interact the CIT and ΔVAT interaction by InterestLimit, an indicator variable equal 
to one if there exists any regulation limiting the deductibility of interest expenses in the affili-
ate’s country. We do not find any differential effect for these affiliates (column (5)) and infer 
that interest deductibility limitations do not inhibit this profit shifting channel for our sample 
firms. 
[Insert Table 12 about here] 
4.4. Robustness Tests 
We conduct several untabulated robustness tests to validate our results. We run a firm-fixed 
effects and random effects model clustering standard errors on the country level for the sales 
reporting and profit shifting analyses and results remain robust.57 We also find very similar 
                                                          
57 A p-value of below 0.0000 in the Hausman test suggests the fixed-effects model is appropriate. 
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results when running a robust regression suggesting that outliers in our sample do not drive the 
results (De Simone 2016). 
Results across all analyses are robust to controlling for a different production function of digital 
service affiliates when we run a fully interacted model (Digital interacted with other explana-
tory variables in the production function). In further robustness checks, we exclude observa-
tions from single countries for which observations are heavily weighted due to superior data 
coverage (France and Spain) and obtain robust results.  
We conduct a further cross-sectional test and limit the sample to affiliates that belong to multi-
national groups with at least three affiliated companies.58 Consistent with this subsample of 
firms having greater tax planning opportunities, we find slightly larger effects of the CIT rate 
on reported pre-tax profits. Further, results hold when replacing personnel expenses by the 
number of employees and winsorizing financial firm data at the 1 and 99 percent level. 
Our results across all analyses are robust to including GDP-growth to account for market po-
tential. We also argue that GDP-growth accounts for potential changes in demand that might 
be correlated with VAT rate changes and firms’ output (sales). These results suggest that the 
response of reported sales to VAT rates is not driven by simultaneous changes in demand and 
serve as robustness additionally to including consumer price levels and inflation rates as well 
as our stringent empirical approach employing country-year fixed effects.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the effect of consumption taxes on firm-level output and whether reporting 
sales in response to consumption taxes explains cross-sectional variation in income tax-moti-
vated profit shifting. We study service firms who have some leeway to plan on consumption 
and income taxes and exploit the European setting with plausibly exogenous changes in value-
added and corporate income tax rates. We estimate that firms, on average, reduce reported sales 
by 0.5 percent if VAT rates increase by one percentage point. We control for country-specific 
contemporaneous trends that might explain tax policy and output levels. Several cross-sectional 
tests based on firms’ industry classification and aggregate sales of a firm’s business group show 
that two channels drive consumption tax planning. First, firms bearing part of the tax burden 
reduce output due to lower expected after-tax profits. Second, firms with leeway over where to 
report sales for VAT purposes shift sales in response to the relative attractiveness of a country’s 
                                                          
58 This analysis is contingent on data availability and accuracy provided by the Amadeus database at the point of 
time of data extraction. 
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VAT rate. Consistent with recent evidence (Jacob et al. 2018), the magnitude of the effects 
depends on firms’ relative size as a proxy for its ability to set prices. 
We then show that, on average, firms do not engage in income tax-motivated profit shifting if 
they exhibit a negative relationship between reported sales and VAT consistent with consump-
tion tax planning placing a constraint on manipulating transfer prices to reduce the global in-
come tax burden. However, these firms more actively use debt financing to reduce pre-tax in-
come in response to income tax rate increases. Our findings thereby contribute to the literature 
on the effect of taxes on corporate decisions and corporate tax planning behavior. We comple-
ment Jacob et al. (2018) by directly showing that firms respond to consumption taxes. Along 
the lines of Blouin et al. (2018), we offer a novel explanation why some firms employ more 
aggressive profit shifting strategies than others. In particular, we are the first to study how con-
sumption and corporate income taxes interrelate and conclude that corporate tax planners con-
sider multiple taxes as a cost to the business. 
Our results have several implications for tax policy design since understanding the interplay of 
direct and indirect taxes is important to evaluate tax policy. Consumption taxes, in particular, 
are a major source of tax revenue, an important element in competition among jurisdictions to 
attract remote firms in the digital sector, and can lead to inefficiencies in corporate decisions. 
First, our findings strongly suggest that consumption taxes affect corporate behavior. That is, 
firms reduce their reported output in response to VAT rate increases. Second, we provide evi-
dence that firms operating in the digital economy indeed exploit tax planning opportunities. 
However, we highlight that circumventing consumption tax burdens seems to dominate income 
tax-motivated profit shifting. This insight potentially speaks to the estimated gap in VAT col-
lection in the EU. It further questions the practical ability of purely consumption-based tax 
systems to mitigate tax avoidance and economic distortions in a globalized and digital econ-
omy. Third, policy makers should carefully evaluate whether to follow the current trend of 
decreasing CIT rates and increasing VAT rates when assessing the impact on corporate deci-
sions and tax revenue (Clausing 2009).  
Although we rely on a large representative sample and provide cross-sectional results in line 
with economic theory, we acknowledge that we cannot directly observe whether firms exclu-
sively generate sales in the designated sector and to what extent our sample affiliates engage in 
cross-border transactions, which is a condition for the ability to engage in international tax 
planning. Also, we do not observe the complete set of affiliates belonging to an MNE in our 
sample but focus on affiliates active in the service industry only. The economic magnitude of 
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our results should thus be interpreted with caution. Another concern would be that an MNE’s 
group structure and choice to locate affiliates in specific countries is not exogenous and might 
be driven by tax factors, among others. We argue that the potential sample selection bias should 
not be a concern since the formation of business groups is not responsive to the business envi-
ronment in the short-term such as tax rate changes that we rely on for our inferences (Khanna 
and Yafeh 2005). 
Overall, our findings add to the literature examining the interaction of consumption and income 
taxes and shed some first light on the tax planning behavior of firms in the digital economy. 
We further add to the income tax avoidance literature by showing that the extent and the chan-
nels of profit shifting are contingent on firms’ responses to consumption tax incentives. Our 
results suggest that firms incorporate both incentives stemming from income and consumption 
tax regimes in their tax planning strategies. We thus consider the channels firms employ to 
account for the interactions of different tax incentives and to optimize on multiple taxes as well 
as firms’ response to tax incentives in the digital economy interesting objects of future analysis.  
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Appendix  
Figure 1: General Collection Process of Value-added Tax in Europe 
 
 
This figure illustrates the mechanism of the value-added tax in Europe. Company B is located in a coun-
try with an applicable VAT rate of 20%. The company incurs input costs of 100 (net) plus VAT on its 
input of 20. Company A, the supplier, receives a gross price of 120 and remits 20 of VAT to the tax 
authority. Company B is granted an input VAT refund of 20. Company B adds another 100 of value and 
sells the final product/service to consumers at gross price of 240. This includes VAT of 40 (20% on a 
net price of 200), which the company remits (on behalf of the final consumer) to the tax authority. The 
service provide B realizes a net profit of 100 (=240-40-120+20). 
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Figure 2: Tax Incidence under VAT increase from 20% to 30% 
 
This figure illustrates the tax incidence falling partly on firms for the example of a VAT rate increase 
from 20% to 30%. Company B used to charge a final price of 240 when the VAT was 20% (see Figure 
1). It may now be able to increase the final price by the same proportional amount as the VAT rate 
increase and charge a final price of 260 (left-hand side of the figure). This would mean the pass-through 
of the VAT increase is 100% and the consumer bears the full burden of the tax increase. Company B 
will again realize a net-of VAT profit of 100. If the consumer is however price sensitive and not willing 
to pay more, company B cannot increase the final price and will remain charging 240 from the consumer 
(right-hand side of the figure). This would mean the pass-through of the VAT increase is 0% and the 
consumers bear none of the tax increase but the firm bears all of it. Company B’s net-of VAT profit then 
looks different and is reduced to 84.62. The final price of 240 includes VAT at a rate of 30%, i.e. 55.38, 
that company B has to remit to the tax authority. 
  
44 
 
Table 1: Sample Composition (Affiliate-year Observations by Country) 
Country Total Sample 
 Obs. %
BE 8,692 2.74
BG 2,676 0.84
CZ 6,254 1.97
DE 6,899 2.18
DK 168 0.05
EE 3,410 1.08
ES 75,458 23.81
FI 10,514 3.32
FR 56,535 17.84
GB 21,677 6.84
HR 405 0.13
HU 297 0.09
IE 1,037 0.33
IT 61,959 19.55
LU 175 0.06
LV 79 0.02
NL 344 0.11
NO 17,813 5.62
PL 1,063 0.34
PT 14,889 4.70
RO 789 0.25
SE 16,859 5.32
SI 6,244 1.97
SK 2,664 0.84
Total 316,900 100.00
The final sample used for our main analyses consists 
of 316,900 affiliate-year observations from 78,954 
unique affiliates located in 24 European countries 
between 2007 and 2015. 
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Table 2: Definition of Variables 
Variable Description 
VAT Value-added tax rate applicable in the respective country (in decimals). 
CIT Corporate income tax rate in in the respective country (in decimals). 
Vatminus Dummy for VAT rate decrease: 1 if observed affiliate-year VAT rate is lower 
than in the previous observed affiliate-year. 
Vatplus Dummy for VAT rate increase: 1 if observed affiliate-year VAT rate is higher 
than in the previous observed affiliate-year. 
LowCIT Dummy equal to 1 if CIT at or below median compared to sample firms (or 
lower than 21%), 0 otherwise. 
ΔVAT Firm-level VAT sensitivity w.r.t. sales reporting; the measure is calculated 
based on the respective coefficients from the regression on sales reporting  
LogSales Natural logarithm of affiliate's sales 
LogEbit Natural logarithm of affiliate's earnings before interest and tax (ebit) 
LogPexp Natural logarithm of affiliate's personnel expenditure 
LogAssets Natural logarithm of affiliate's total assets 
LogGroupsales Natural logarithm of aggregate sales of all entities in same group 
RoA Return on Assets measured as affiliate’s ebit scaled by total assets 
IntExpoA Interest Expense over Assets, measured as affiliate’s interest expense (differ-
ence between ebit and ebt) scaled by total assets 
Highassetshare Dummy equal to 1 if affiliate’s share of total assets to total assets of the in-
dustry segment is in the highest quartile of industry total assets sorted by 
country and year in t-1, 0 otherwise 
Digital Dummy equal to 1 for digital service provider affiliates: 1 if NACE Rev 2 
classification (NACE1 in Amadeus) belongs to the potential group of digital 
services, 0 otherwise (see Table 15) 
B2C_non-digital Dummy equal to 1 for service provider affiliates selling non-digital services 
in the B2C segment, 0 otherwise 
Intrafirm Dummy equal to 1 for service provider affiliates selling services mainly intra-
group, i.e. when parent firm not a service provider itself nor a holding com-
pany (GUO is industrial firm), 0 otherwise 
B2B Dummy equal to 1 for service provider affiliates active in the B2B segment, 0 
otherwise 
Multi Dummy equal to 1 if country of parent differs from country of affiliate (i.e. 
foreign), 0 otherwise 
Intl Dummy equal to 1 affiliate belongs to a MNE group for which we observe af-
filiates in at least two countries in the sample, 0 otherwise 
Inflation Country-specific rate of inflation (in decimals). 
LogConsPrice Natural logarithm of indexed consumer price levels for the total services sec-
tor. Country-specific price levels are indexed (100 being the EU-28 average) 
and measured in purchasing parity power. 
LogGDP Natural logarithm of country's gross domestic product per capita 
InterestLimit Dummy equal to 1 if country has implemented an interest deduction limita-
tion regulation, 0 otherwise 
Ttc_c Time to comply regarding consumption taxes, measured in hours, taken from 
PwC and World Bank Group’s annual report “Paying Taxes” 
Sources: VAT rates are taken from KPMG; CIT rates are based on effective tax rates in European Com-
mission/ZEW (2016) and KPMG. GDP data is from the Worldbank’s World Development Indicators data-
base. Consumer price levels and inflation rates data is from Eurostat. Ttc_c is from World Bank 
Group/PwC. InterestLimit is from the IBFD European Tax Handbooks.  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Regressions 
Variable unit mean sd min max 
Sales EUR ,000 20,923.62 256,566.75 500.00 44,436,615.00
Ebit EUR ,000 1,854.87 31,544.38 1.00 4,356,366.00
VAT - 0.21 0.02 0.15 0.27
CIT - 0.31 0.06 0.10 0.39
ΔVAT - -0.37 3.47 -14.09 12.69
Pexp EUR ,000 4,363.12 42,072.40 1.00 6,707,383.00
Assets EUR ,000 28,985.98 427,909.67 9.00 79,242,530.00
GDP EUR/capita 39,162.54 16,228.24 5,932.90 119,172.74
ConsPrice Normalized (100) 105.22 24.84 27.70 187.00
Inflation - 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.15
Ttc_c Hours 57.53 55.17 16.00 360.00
The sample used in the main empirical tests consists of 316,900 affiliate-year observations from 78,954 
unique affiliates of 63,958 global ultimate owners located in 24 European countries between 2007 and 
2015. This table reports summary statistics for the constructed variable ΔVAT, which measures the firm-
specific VAT sensitivity w.r.t. reporting sales. The measure is derived by running a regression based on 
equation (1) (excluding the interaction of VAT and foreign-owned firms) with VAT interacted with the 
firm fixed effects vector. The point estimate for this interaction term is then multiplied by -1 and labelled 
ΔVAT.  
Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
(1) Sales 1.00 
(2) EBIT 0.511 1.00 
(3) VAT -0.031 -0.025 1.00 
(4) CIT -0.011 -0.008 -0.420 1.00 
(5) Pexp 0.473 0.378 -0.037 -0.007 1.00 
(6) Assets 0.497 0.544 -0.021 -0.015 0.466 1.00 
(7) GDP 0.007 0.002 0.456 -0.053 0.010 0.003 1.00 
(8) ConsPrice 0.019 0.012 0.354 0.054 0.027 0.013 0.917 1.00 
(9) Inflation 0.010 0.008 -0.203 -0.071 0.011 0.005 0.063 -0.006 1.00 
(10) ΔVAT -0.032 -0.017 0.047 -0.031 -0.021 -0.014 0.043 0.036 -0.003 1.00 
(11) Ttc_c -0.015 -0.004 -0.359 -0.034 -0.021 -0.010 -0.276 -0.415 0.203 0.019 1.00 
This table presents the correlations between our main control variables and variables of interest.  
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Table 5: Sales Reporting and Consumption Taxes 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. Var.: 
LogSales 
Prod. Fctn. VAT VAT 
CIT 
Foreign 
Parent 
Digital 
VAT  -0.4341*** -0.5201*** -0.7592*** -0.4318*** 
  (0.0820) (0.0835) (0.0950) (0.0850) 
Multi*VAT    0.5582***  
    (0.1340)  
Digital*VAT     -1.2304*** 
     (0.2298) 
CIT   -0.1451*** -0.0505 -0.1469*** 
   (0.0413) (0.0514) (0.0418) 
Multi*CIT    -0.2591***  
    (0.0786)  
Digital*CIT     0.0517 
     (0.1825) 
Ttc_c  0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LogPexp 0.3497*** 0.3488*** 0.3487*** 0.3485*** 0.3487*** 
 (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) 
LogAssets 0.4189*** 0.4184*** 0.4183*** 0.4181*** 0.4187*** 
 (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) 
LogGDP 0.5865*** 0.4389*** 0.4420*** 0.4224*** 0.4411*** 
 (0.0213) (0.0235) (0.0235) (0.0236) (0.0235) 
LogConsPrice -0.2290*** -0.1468*** -0.1694*** -0.1606*** -0.1689*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0235) (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0237) 
Inflation 1.5632*** 1.1138*** 1.1208*** 1.1031*** 1.1204*** 
 (0.0844) (0.0854) (0.0854) (0.0856) (0.0854) 
Constant -2.5844*** -1.3276*** -1.1906*** -1.0123*** -1.1899*** 
 (0.1621) (0.1837) (0.1853) (0.1871) (0.1851) 
Observations 316,900 316,900 316,900 316,900 316,900 
R-squared 0.5368 0.5374 0.5374 0.5376 0.5376 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
This table reports coefficient estimates from linear panel regressions on the affiliate level, using a fixed 
effects model and robust standard errors. The sample consists of 316,900 affiliate-year observations 
from affiliates located in 24 European countries between 2007 and 2015 with sufficient data from 
Amadeus for the regressions. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the affiliate’s operating 
revenue (sales). Column (1) reports results for a parsimonious model of the typical productivity estima-
tion using the full sample. Column (2) includes the VAT rate as the variable of interest to examine the 
sales reporting behaviour of service affiliates. Column (3) also includes the CIT rate to control for other 
features of the tax system. Column (4) includes the indicator variable Multi for foreign global ultimate 
owners and the interaction with the VAT rate. Column (5) includes the indicator variable Digital and 
the interaction with the VAT rate. Tests of joint significance yield a p-value smaller than 0.01 for each 
case of interactions. Robust standard errors, clustered on affiliate level, are presented in parentheses. *, 
** and *** represent two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 6: Cross-sectional Tests: Industries 
Dep. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LogSales Baseline Digital B2C 
non-digital 
Intrafirm B2B 
VAT -0.5201***     
 (0.0835)     
Industry*VAT  -1.2417*** -0.9286*** 1.0806*** 0.8445*** 
  (0.2318) (0.1230) (0.3454) (0.1235) 
Observations 316,900 299,900 299,900 119,984 299,900 
R-squared 0.5374 0.9842 0.9842 0.9853 0.9842 
Firm controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES NO NO NO NO 
Country-Year FE NO YES YES YES YES 
This table reports coefficient estimates from linear panel regressions on the affiliate level, using a fixed 
effects model and robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the affiliate’s 
operating revenue (sales). Column (1) reports results of our main specification (Table 5 column (3)). 
The constant term is not reported here. Columns (2) to (5) include the VAT rate interacted with an 
indicator variable for the respective industry segments Industry*VAT (where Industry is Digital, 
B2C_non-digital, Intrafirm, respectively B2B). Robust standard errors, clustered on affiliate level, are 
presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: Cross-sectional Tests: Industries and Market Share (Total Assets) in t-1 
Dep. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LogSales Baseline Digital B2C 
non-digital 
Intrafirm B2B 
VAT -0.8879***     
 (0.1005)     
Highassetshare -0.1271*** -0.0966*** -0.0560* -0.0893* -0.1159*** 
 (0.0300) (0.0315) (0.0323) (0.0483) (0.0317) 
Industry*VAT  -0.9042*** -0.7511*** 0.8813** 0.7721*** 
  (0.2694) (0.1335) (0.3517) (0.1367) 
Highassetshare*VAT 0.7101*** 0.5597*** 0.3774** 0.4564* 0.5812*** 
 (0.1488) (0.1569) (0.1597) (0.2411) (0.1585) 
Industry*  -0.3272*** -0.1521*** -0.1089 0.1445*** 
Highassetshare*VAT  (0.0640) (0.0342) (0.0745) (0.0317) 
Observations 223,779 210,296 210,296 84,522 210,296 
R-squared 0.5093 0.9878 0.9878 0.9888 0.9878 
Firm controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES NO NO NO NO 
Country-Year FE NO YES YES YES YES 
This table reports coefficient estimates from linear panel regressions on the affiliate level, using a fixed 
effects model and robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the affiliate’s 
operating revenue (sales). Column (1) reports results of estimating equation (1) augmented by an inter-
action term of Highassetshare*VAT. The constant term is not reported here. Columns (2) to (5) include 
the interaction term of Highassetshare*VAT, the VAT rate interacted with an indicator variable for the 
respective industry segments Industry*VAT and the triple interaction term for Indus-
try*Highassetshare*VAT. Robust standard errors, clustered on affiliate level, are presented in parenthe-
ses. *, ** and *** represent two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respec-
tively.  
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Table 8: Group-level Analysis: Total Sales and Consumption Taxes 
Dep. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LogGroupsales Baseline Intl Digital B2C  
non-digita 
Intrafirm B2B 
VAT -2.4552***      
 (0.2227)      
Intl*VAT 3.5482*** 3.4382*** 3.3073*** 3.3628*** 3.3240*** 3.5309*** 
 (0.3270) (0.3417) (0.3613) (0.4079) (0.4635) (0.3643) 
Industry*VAT   -4.5920*** 0.1605 -0.1358 0.7668* 
   (0.6069) (0.3927) (0.6919) (0.4309) 
Industry*   2.0463** 0.2398 0.2356 -0.3089 
Intl*VAT   (0.8943) (0.6918) (1.0075) (0.8189) 
Constant 6.2155***      
 (0.4127)      
Observations 91,582 85,284 85,284 85,284 57,176 85,284 
R-squared 0.3025 0.9919 0.9919 0.9919 0.9924 0.9919 
Firm controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Country-Year FE NO YES YES YES YES YES 
This table reports coefficient estimates from linear panel regressions on the affiliate level, using a fixed effects 
model and robust standard errors. The sample consists of all affiliate-year observations aggregated at the 
individual group-level (same global ultimate owner). The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 
group-wide sales. Column (1) reports results of estimating equation (1) with LogGroupsales as the dependent 
variable and augmented by an interaction term of Intl*VAT. Column (2) reports results of the similar regres-
sion using country-year fixed effects. Columns (3) to (6) include the interaction term of Intl*VAT, the VAT 
rate interacted with an indicator variable for the respective industry segments Industry*VAT and the triple 
interaction term for Industry*Intl*VAT. Robust standard errors, clustered on affiliate level, are presented in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** represent two-tailed statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respec-
tively. 
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Table 9: Consumption Tax Planning and Profit Shifting Incentives 
Dep. Var.: (1) (2) 
LogSales CIT Median CIT < 21% 
VATminus 0.0299*** 0.0271*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0047) 
VATplus -0.0110*** -0.0053*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0011) 
VATplus*LowCIT 0.0126*** 0.0159*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0045) 
VATminus*LowCIT  0.0048 
  (0.0202) 
Constant -2.0742*** -2.0092*** 
 (0.1800) (0.1808) 
Observations 263,365 263,365 
R-squared 0.5141 0.5141 
Firm Controls YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Country-Year FE NO NO 
This table reports coefficient estimates from linear panel regressions 
modifying equation (1) of Table 7 by using dummy variables for VAT 
rate increases and decreases and including the interaction term of these 
dummies with an indicator variable for the CIT rate. The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of the affiliate’s sales. In Column (1), 
the indicator is equal to one if the CIT rate in the respective country is 
below median of the sample.59 In Column (2) the indicator is equal to 
one if the CIT rate in the respective country is below 21%. Tests of joint 
significance yield a p-value smaller than 0.01 for each case of interac-
tions. Robust standard errors, clustered on affiliate level, are presented 
in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent two-tailed statistical signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
                                                          
59 The coefficient on the interaction of VATminus and LowCIT cannot be reported in column (1) since VAT rate 
decreases are rare (only about 2,800 observations) and hardly occur for countries in our sample with a CIT rate 
below median. 
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Table 10: Profit Shifting and Consumption Taxes 
Dep. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LogEbit Baseline VAT D-VAT D-VAT 
Full Int. 
CIT -0.4737*** -0.6028*** -0.3634*** -0.4937*** 
 (0.1285) (0.1334) (0.1297) (0.1346) 
ΔVAT*CIT   0.1785*** 0.1790*** 
   (0.0347) (0.0347) 
VAT  -0.7232***  -0.7320*** 
  (0.2620)  (0.2623) 
ΔVAT*VAT    4.2952*** 
    (0.0950) 
LogPexp 0.1108*** 0.1102*** 0.1094*** 0.1013*** 
 (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0065) 
LogAssets 0.7517*** 0.7517*** 0.7508*** 0.7269*** 
 (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0085) 
LogGDP 0.3296*** 0.2606*** 0.3365*** 0.2849*** 
 (0.0413) (0.0449) (0.0413) (0.0444) 
Constant -4.6891*** -3.7764*** -4.7603*** -3.6346*** 
 (0.4379) (0.5057) (0.4383) (0.4995) 
Observations 316,900 316,900 299,901 299,901 
R-squared 0.0958 0.0959 0.0960 0.1118 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
This table reports coefficient estimates from linear panel regressions on the affiliate level, 
using a fixed effects model and robust standard errors. The sample consists of 316,900 
affiliate-year observations from affiliates located in 24 European countries between 2007 
and 2015 with sufficient data from Amadeus for the regressions (299,901 observations 
when the ΔVAT measure is included respectively). The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of the affiliate’s EBIT. Column (1) reports results for the benchmark profit shift-
ing regression including the CIT rate as the variable of interest. Column (2) extends the 
baseline regression by including the VAT rate. Column (3) extends the baseline regression 
by including interaction of ΔVAT, the constructed measure of firm-specific VAT sensitivity 
w.r.t reporting sales, and the CIT. Column (4) presents regression results of this extended 
model when ΔVAT is also interacted with the VAT rate. Tests of joint significance yield a 
p-value smaller than 0.01 for each case of interactions. Robust standard errors, clustered 
on MNE-group level, are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent two-tailed sta-
tistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 3: Profit Shifting and Consumption Taxes - Marginal Effects (ΔVAT) 
 This figure illustrates the marginal effects of a change in CIT rates on reported pre-tax 
profits (EBIT), i.e. the measure of profit shifting, at the different values of firm-specific 
VAT sensitivity w.r.t. reporting sales (ΔVAT). Marginal effects are based on the regression 
output as depicted in Column (3) of the preceding table. 
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Table 11: Profit Shifting and Consumption Taxes: Cross-Sectional Tests (Industries) 
Dep. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LogEbit Baseline Digital B2C 
non-digital 
Intrafirm B2B 
CIT -0.3634***     
 (0.1297)     
Industry*CIT  0.1973 -0.1769 0.2481 0.4954** 
  (0.4984) (0.2384) (0.5909) (0.2438) 
ΔVAT*CIT 0.1785*** 0.1586*** 0.0698 0.2762*** 0.2627*** 
 (0.0347) (0.0360) (0.0454) (0.0592) (0.0419) 
Industry*  0.2661* 0.2398*** -0.0615 -0.2949*** 
ΔVAT*CIT  (0.1483) (0.0702) (0.1828) (0.0747) 
Observations 299,901 299,900 299,900 119,984 299,900 
R-squared 0.0960 0.8550 0.8550 0.8635 0.8550 
Firm Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES NO NO NO NO 
Country-Year FE NO YES YES YES YES 
This table reports coefficient estimates from linear panel regressions on the affiliate level, using a fixed 
effects model and robust standard errors. The sample consists of 299,901 affiliate-year observations 
since we include the ΔVAT measure. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the affiliate’s 
EBIT. Column (1) reports results of estimating equation (2) including the interaction of the CIT rate and 
the ΔVAT measure. The constant term is not reported here. Columns (2) to (5) include the interaction 
term of ΔVAT*CIT, the CIT rate interacted with an indicator variable for the respective industry seg-
ments Industry*VAT and the triple interaction term for Industry*ΔVAT*VAT. Tests of joint significance 
yield a p-value smaller than 0.01 for each case of interactions. Robust standard errors, clustered on 
MNE-group level, are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** and represent two-tailed statistical signif-
icance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 12: Profit Shifting Channels and Consumption Taxes  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep. Var.: RoA IntExpoA RoA IntExpoA IntExpoA 
CIT -0.0526*** 0.0047*    
 (0.0106) (0.0026)    
ΔVAT*CIT 0.0176*** 0.0019*** 0.0158*** 0.0021*** 0.0023*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0007) (0.0029) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
InterestLimit*     -0.0000 
ΔVAT*CIT     (0.0001) 
LogPexp 0.0052*** 0.0011*** 0.0055*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
LogAssets -0.0243*** -0.0030*** -0.0248*** -0.0030*** -0.0030*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
LogGDP 0.0165*** -0.0045***    
 (0.0038) (0.0009)    
Constant 0.1141*** 0.0753***    
 (0.0396) (0.0095)    
Observations 299,901 299,901 299,900 299,900 299,900 
R-squared 0.0269 0.0141 0.6804 0.6240 0.6240 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES NO NO NO 
Country-Year FE NO NO YES YES YES 
This table reports coefficient estimates from linear panel regressions on the affiliate level, using a fixed 
effects model and robust standard errors. The sample consists of 299,901 affiliate-year observations 
since we include the ΔVAT measure. The dependent variable is the affiliate’s Return on Assets (RoA) in 
columns (1) and (3) and the affiliate’s ratio of interest expense to total assets (IntExpoA) in columns (2), 
(4) and (5). Column (1) reports results of estimating equation (2) with RoA as the dependent variable 
including the interaction of the CIT rate and the ΔVAT measure. Column (2) reports results of estimating 
equation (2) with IntExpoA as the dependent variable including the interaction of the CIT rate and the 
ΔVAT measure. Columns (3) and (4) repeat these tests including country-year fixed effects. Column (5) 
extends the specification from column (4) by additionally interacting the ΔVAT*CIT interaction with an 
indicator variable for the existence of interest deductibility limitation rules. Tests of joint significance 
yield a p-value smaller than 0.01 for each case of interactions. Robust standard errors, clustered on 
MNE-group level, are presented in parentheses. *, ** and *** and represent two-tailed statistical signif-
icance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Online Appendix  
Table 13: VAT and CIT Rate Changes 2007-2015 
Panel A: VAT Rates and Changes for Sample Countries 
 2007 ∆2008 ∆2009 ∆2010 ∆2011 ∆2012 ∆2013 ∆2014 ∆2015 2015 
BE 21.00 - - - - - - - - 21.00 
BG 20.00 - - - - - - - - 20.00 
CZ 19.00 - - 1.00 - - 1.00 - - 21.00 
DE 19.00 - - - - - - - - 19.00 
DK 25.00 - - - - - - - - 25.00 
EE 18.00 - - 2.00 - - - - - 20.00 
ES 16.00 - - 2.00 - 3.00 - - - 21.00 
FI 22.00 - - 1.00 - - 1.00 - - 24.00 
FR 19.60 - - - - - - 0.40 - 20.00 
GB 17.50 - -2.50 2.50 2.50 - - - - 20.00 
HR 22.00 - - 1.00 - 2.00 - - - 25.00 
HU 20.00 - - 5.00 - 2.00 - - - 27.00 
IE 21.00 - 0.50 -0.50 - 2.00 - - - 23.00 
IT 20.00 - - - 1.00 - - 1.00 - 22.00 
LU 15.00 - - - - - - - 2.00 17.00 
LV 18.00 - 3.00 - 1.00 -1.00 - - - 21.00 
NL 19.00 - - - - 2.00 - - - 21.00 
NO 25.00 - - - - - - - - 25.00 
PL 22.00 - - - 1.00 - - - - 23.00 
PT 21.00 - -1.00 1.00 2.00 - - - - 23.00 
RO 19.00 - - 5.00 - - - - - 24.00 
SE 25.00 - - - - - - - - 25.00 
SI 20.00 - - - - - 2.00 - - 22.00 
SK 19.00 - - - 1.00 - - - - 20.00 
Ø 20.13 - 0 2.00 1.42 1.67 1.33 0.70 2.00 22.04 
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Panel B: CIT Rates and Changes for Sample Countries 
 2007 ∆2008 ∆2009 ∆2010 ∆2011 ∆2012 ∆2013 ∆2014 ∆2015 2015 
BE 33.99 - - - - - - - - 33.99 
BG 10.00 - - - - - - - - 10.00 
CZ 24.00 -3.00 -1.00 -1.00 - - - - - 19.00 
DE 39.35 -8.40 - - - - - - - 30.95 
DK 25.00 - - - - - - -0.50 -2.50 22.00 
EE 22.00 -1.00 - - - - - - -1.00 20.00 
ES 38.01 -2.27 - - -0.49 - - - -1.85 33.40 
FI 26.00 - - - - -1.50 - -4.50 - 20.00 
FR 34.43 - - 0.99 - 1.64 - 1.87 - 38.93 
GB 30.00 -2.00 - - -2.00 -2.00 -1.00 -2.00 -1.00 20.00 
HR 20.00 - - - - - - - - 20.00 
HU 20.00 - - - - - - - - 20.00 
IE 12.50 - - - - - - - - 12.50 
IT 37.25 -5.95 - - - - - - - 31.30 
LU 29.63 - -1.04 - 0.21 - 0.42 - - 29.00 
LV 15.00 - - - - - - - - 15.00 
NL 25.50 - - - -0.50 - - - - 25.00 
NO 28.00 - - - - - - -1.00 - 27.00 
PL 19.00 - - - - - - - - 19.00 
PT 26.50 - - 2.50 - 2.50 - - -2.00 29.50 
RO 16.00 - - - - - - - - 16.00 
SE 28.00 - -2.00 - - - -4.00 - - 22.00 
SI 23.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 - -2.00 -1.00 - - 17.00 
SK 19.00 - - - - - 4.00 -1.00 - 22.00 
Ø 25.09 -3.37 -1.26 0.37 -0.70 -0.27 -0.32 -1.19 -1.67 23.07 
This table maps VAT and CIT rate changes in Panel A and B, respectively, of the countries in our sample 
for the period 2007-2015. The rate changes are presented in percentage points. 
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Table 14: Total Sales in the Information and Communications Services Sector (NACE 58-63)  
Total sales in: 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Eurostat 134,290.6 128,450.9 133,787.2 137,372.1 
Dataset 170,000.0 175,000.0 178,000.0 171,000.0 
Δ% +27% +36% +33% +24% 
This table compares the coverage of total sales of affiliates in the information and communication ser-
vices sector in the regression sample (Dataset) with the consolidated statistics of sales in this sector 
provided by the statistical office of the European Union (Eurostat (online). 
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Figure 4: Value-added Taxation of Digital Services in Europe  
 
 
This figure illustrates the value-added taxation of digital service providers delivering to a final customer 
in Europe. The cross-border digital service provider is established in country A, which charges VAT at 
a rate of 20%. The domestic digital service provider and the final consumer (non-taxable person for 
VAT purposes) are established in country B, which charges VAT at a rate of 25%. Both companies incur 
input costs of 100 (net, plus VAT). The domestic digital service provider, company B, is liable to input 
VAT of 25 (100*25%) and is later granted an input VAT refund of 25. The digital service is sold to the 
consumer at a price of 200 (gross). The delivery of this service is taxable at the domestic rate of 25%. 
The gross price of 200 thus includes VAT of 40 (25% on a net price of 160), which the company remits 
(on behalf of the final consumer) to the tax authority of country B. The service provider realizes a net 
profit of 60 (net sales price of 160 less input cost of 100). The delivery of cross-border digital services 
by company A to the final consumer is taxable in the country of the service provider (origin principle; 
applicable until 2014) at a rate of 20%. The gross price of 200 includes VAT of 33.33 (20% on a net 
price of 166.67), which the company remits (on behalf of the final consumer) to the tax authority of 
country A. The service provider realizes a net profit of 66.67 (net sales price of 166.67 less input cost 
of 100). Hence, the cross-border digital service provider’s profit is 6.67 higher than the domestic service 
provider’s profit.  
60 
 
Table 15: Classification of Digital Services (NACE Rev. 2 Codes) 
NACE Rev. 2 Code Description 
5821 Publishing of computer games 
5829 Other software publishing 
5913 Motion picture, video and television programme distribution activities 
5920 Sound recording and music publishing activities 
6209 Other information technology and computer service activities 
6311 Data processing, hosting and related activities 
6312 Web portals 
6391 News agency activities 
6399 Other information service activities n.e.c. 
7722 Renting of video tapes and disks 
8559 Other education n.e.c. 
9200 Gambling and betting activities 
The NACE Rev. 2 Codes and descriptions are based on the industry classification published by Eurostat, 
the Statistical Office of the European Communities. The selection of NACE Rev. 2 Codes covers po-
tential digital services. The complete segmentation of economic activities is available at http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/5902521/KS-RA-07-015-EN.PDF. N.e.c. is short for not else-
where classified. 
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Figure 5: Distribution of Country-Year Tax Rate Distances to Mean 
 
The red and blue boxes in this figure indicate the distribution of affiliate-year observations 
within the 25th and 75th percentile of the difference between the country’s tax rate and the 
average tax rate across countries in the EU in the period 2007-2015. The median is marked 
with a vertical line in the box. Values outside the 25th and 75th percentile are indicated as 
dots. The country’s difference to means are calculated as follows. E.g. the VAT distance to 
mean of Italy in 2010 = mean(VAT 2010)-VAT(Italy in 2010); i.e. positive values suggest 
more attractive than average tax rate (country's tax rate is lower than the mean). 
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Figure 6: Consumption and Corporate Income Tax Rate Policies 2015 
The blue points in this figure indicate the VAT respectively CIT rate applicable in the 24 
countries included in our sample for the year 2015. The red lines indicate the mean VAT 
respectively CIT rate in 2015 across the 24 countries included in our regression analysis.  
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Table 16: Robustness Tests: REGHDFE-Regression to Calculate ΔVAT 
Dep. Var.: (1) (2) 
LogSales Reg. HDFE VAT*Firm FE 
VAT -0.5201***  
 (0.0694)  
CIT -0.1451*** 0.1478*** 
 (0.0334) (0.0433) 
Ttc_c 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
LogPexp 0.3487*** 0.3344*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0055) 
LogAssets 0.4183*** 0.3835*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0042) 
LogGDP 0.4420*** 0.1822*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0240) 
LogConsPrice -0.1694*** 0.0652*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0229) 
Inflation 1.1208*** 0.9381*** 
 (0.0736) (0.0778) 
Observations 299,901 299,901 
R-squared (within)  0.491 
Firm FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
This table reports the regression results when running the regression of reported 
sales on the explanatory variables as in Column (3) of Table 5 using the high di-
mensional fixed effects estimator by Correia (2016) (reghdfe command in STATA). 
Column (1) reports results replicating Column (3) of Table 5 with affiliate fixed 
effects. Column (2) reports results when the VAT rate is interacted with the affiliate 
fixed effects. The results of this regression, i.e. the point estimates on the interac-
tion term, are used to construct the variable ΔVAT. 
